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SINGLED OUT: A PROPOSAL TO EXTEND
ASYLUM TO THE UNMARRIED PARTNERS OF

CHINESE NATIONALS FLEEING THE ONE-CHILD
POLICY
Raina Nortick*
INTRODUCTION

The men with the poison-filled syringe arrived two days before Li
Juan's due date. They pinned her down on a bed in a local clinic, she
says, and drove the needle into her abdomen until it entered the 9-monthold fetus. "At first, I could feel my child kicking a lot," says the 23-yearold. "Then, after a while, I couldn't feel her moving anymore." Ten
hours later, Li delivered the girl she had intended to name Shuang
(Bright). The baby was dead. To be absolutely sure, says Li, the
officials-from the Linyi region, where she lives, in China's eastern
Shandong province-dunked the infant's body for several minutes in a
bucket of water beside the bed.l

Horrific stories of fines, arrests, late-term abortions, and sterilizations
abound in China, as people suffer the harsh consequences of violating the
country's notorious one-child policy. 2 But the Chinese government
staunchly defends its population control policy as the linchpin to ensuring
economic and social development; 3 furthermore, officials deny that
population control measures are enforced coercively. 4 Faced with the
difficult choice between country and family, many Chinese nationals
J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Hannah Beech, Enemies of the State? How Local Officials in China Launched a
Brutal Campaign of Forced Abortions and Sterilizations, Time, Sept. 19, 2005, at 58,
availableat http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1103579-1,00.html.
2. See infra Part I.B.2. The one-child policy generally restricts Chinese families from
having more than one child in order to control the country's booming population. See, e.g.,
Steven W. Mosher, A Mother's Ordeal: One Woman's Fight Against China's One-Child
Policy (1993).
3. See PremierSays China to Continue with One-Child Policy, Associated Press, Dec.
27, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/27/asia/ASGEN China_
OneChildPolicy.php (describing the one-child policy as key to China's modernization);
see also infra note 20.
4. See China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy
Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong. 50 (2004)
[hereinafter Human Rights Hearing] (prepared statement of John S. Aird, Former Senior
Research Specialist on China, U.S. Census Bureau) (alleging that the Chinese government is
well aware of the use of extreme cruelty in enforcing the one-child policy, but claims that
the National Family Planning Law prohibits coercion); see also infra note 50.
*
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instead flee to the safe haven of the United States and apply for political
asylum. Before 1996, victims of the one-child policy were turned away at
the border because the U.S. government did not recognize China's
population control policy as persecutory. 5 However, 1996 legislative
amendments 6 to the Immigration and Naturalization Act 7 reversed this
stance on Chinese immigration, broadening the definition of refugee 8 to
include those people forced to undergo abortion or sterilization at the hand
of their government's population control regime.
Administrative interpretation of the newly amended immigration law
further extended the scope of refugee protection to shield the spouses of
one-child policy victims. 9 If Li Juan managed to smuggle herself to the
United States, she could seek asylum after testifying about her frightening
experience at the abortion clinic.' 0 If Li Juan's legal husband came to the
United States-with or without Li Juan herself-he too would find shelter
due to the government's violation of his wife. But the United States would
be much less welcoming to the father of Li Juan's aborted child if the
couple did not, or could not, legally marry in China."I
This Note argues that the couple's marital status should not be the
threshold factor in evaluating asylum applications from Chinese nationals
fleeing coercive family planning measures. Immigration authorities cannot
continue to correlate the seriousness of harm a couple suffers after a forced
abortion or sterilization with the legal status of their relationship. Marital
status is a convenient but faulty substitute for accurate fact-finding
regarding persecution. This Note advocates using marital status as one of
many possible ways to prove persecution; it should not be the determinative
factor. To avoid arbitrarily denying deserving asylum claims, immigration
judges should inspect the closeness of a couple's relationship--married or
not-to determine if the physically unharmed partner was nonetheless
persecuted by the Chinese government's one-child policy.
5. Before congressional intervention in 1996, the decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) In re Chang, which denied asylum to an applicant claiming that China's onechild policy in and of itself is coercive and persecutory, was controlling precedent. In re
Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 44 (B.I.A. 1989). Absent a showing that the Chinese
government handpicked the applicant for a forced abortion or sterilization, general
enforcement of the one-child policy did not meet U.S. asylum criteria. See infra note 61 and
accompanying text.
6. Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
I 101 (a)(42)(B) (2000)).
7. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).

8. The Immigration and Naturalization Act defines a refugee as a person outside of his
or her country of origin or last residence who is unable or unwilling to return to that country
"because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. §
1101 (a)(42)(A).
9. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 919-20 (B.I.A. 1997).
10. See, e.g., Wang v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting asylum
to a female applicant based on two forced abortions she suffered in China).
11. See infra Part II.A. 1-3.
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This Note discusses historical perspectives on China's one-child policy,
the current status of the U.S. immigration law governing Chinese refugees,
and a proposal for future revisions to asylum law. Part I investigates the
origins of the one-child policy, its operation, and its vitality in China today.
This part then addresses the various attempts by policymakers in the United
States to fashion an asylum remedy for Chinese nationals victimized by
coercive population control measures, culminating in the passage of the
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA). 12 Finally, it analyzes the expansion of asylum rights for married
couples brought about by the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA)
landmark decision In re C-Y-Z-. 13 However, administrative interpretation
of the law may not be determinative. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., circuit courts review administrative
decisions using a reasonableness standard, and they ultimately decide4
whether the BIA's marital status restrictions should carry the force of law.'
Thus, Part II considers a series of circuit court decisions to discern the
status of the law regarding unmarried Chinese refugees applying for asylum
after In re C-Y-Z-. In the majority of these cases, the circuit courts have
chosen to defer to the BIA's finding that the IIRIRA provides derivative
asylum rights for married couples only. However, a small minority of
circuits have found the BIA's marital status restrictions to be arbitrary and
ill-defined; consequently, they do not confer Chevron deference to the
BIA's decision in In re C-Y-Z-. Part III advocates extending asylum to all
Chinese nationals seeking refuge from coercive population control
programs, regardless of their marital status. This part rejects traditional
arguments for marital status restrictions in favor of a more progressive,
merit-based asylum policy.
I. CHINA'S RESTRICTIVE ONE-CHILD POLICY AND A CORRELATING
CHANGE IN U.S. ASYLUM LAW

China introduced population control measures in 1979, arguing that its
citizens must balance their reproductive rights with their duty to ensure the
nation's well-being.15 The government's justification has not persuaded the
12. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2000)).
13. 21 1.&N. Dec. 915.
14. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-

44 (1984).
15. The Programme of Action adopted at the International Conference on Population
and Development, held in Cairo, Egypt in 1994, emphasizes that all couples have the right to
freely decide how many children they want. United Nations International Conference on
Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Programmeof Action,

7.3,

U.N. Doc. A!CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994). The Chinese government acknowledges the
basic human right, but argues that its citizens should temper this right with the overriding
interests of the nation. See Info. Office of the State Council of the P.R.C., Family Planning
in China, pt. VII (1995), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/familypanning/index.htm
[hereinafter White Paper]. The government thus justifies the one-child policy as a way to

ensure that the rights of the many are not trampled by the rights of the individual. Id
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international community of the validity of China's one-child policy, and
concerns about human rights abuses eventually compelled the United States
to craft legal safeguards for the policy's victims. Part I.A examines the
one-child policy from its inception to the present day. Part I.B particularly
addresses enforcement of the Chinese government's family size restrictions.
Part I.C then turns to a discussion of a seven-year effort by U.S.
policymakers to create meaningful asylum protection for Chinese nationals
fleeing their home country's coercive one-child policy. Part I.D outlines
the coercive population control asylum legislation finally passed in 1996.
Lastly, Part I.E presents a landmark case in which the BIA expanded
asylum rights for Chinese refugees to include not only victims of the onechild policy, but also their spouses.
A. China's One-ChildPolicy: Origins, Structure, and Function
In October 1949, Mao Zedong-China's then-Chairman-proclaimed
the establishment of the People's Republic of China, 16 a great nation made
greater by its people. Accordingly, Mao adopted a population policy that
encouraged couples to have many children. 17 China's population boomed
from an estimated 540 million to over 800 million people in only thirty
years. 18 But the consequences of unchecked population expansion-which
included declining health and living standards, housing shortages, and
increased unemploymentI 9-took a toll on China's ability to develop
socially and economically. 20 The government needed a systematic plan
emphasizing the necessity of sustainable growth--one that would
reprogram the nation's priorities. Thus, in 1979 the Chinese government
16. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic 50
(3d ed. 1999).
17. Xizhe Peng, Population Policy and Program in China: Challenge and Prospective,

35 Tex. Int'l L.J. 51, 52 (2000). Mao's ideology of "the more people the more power"
underscored his population policy. See Lisa B. Gregory, Note, Examining the Economic
Component of China's One-Child Family Policy Under InternationalLaw: Your Money or

Your Life, 6 J. Chinese L. 45, 48 (1992). A surge of births would also provide more workers
to fuel an economic and industrial revolution; as Mao reasoned, "[elvery mouth comes with
two hands." Peter Goodspeed, "Fewer Children-Fewer Burdens": Severe Birth-Control
Measures Air to Curb Demands of Swelling Population, Still Another 64,000 Babies are

Born Daily, Toronto Star, Jan. 11, 1991, at B 1.
18. Nicole M. Skalla, Note, China's One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and the Family

PlanningLaw, 30 Brook. J. Int'l L. 329, 332 (2004).
19. The Chinese government has traditionally cited concerns with poverty, infant
mortality, and insufficient food and housing supplies in support of the one-child policy. See
Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal
Failures in China's Family-PlanningProgram, 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 145, 150 & n.19

(1996). Propagating a policy that can result in measures as extreme as third trimester
abortions and infanticide in order to lower infant mortality rates illuminates the
government's conflicted reasoning. See infra Part I.B.2.
20. See White Paper, supra note 15, pt. I ("From the early 1970s, the Chinese
government had become increasingly deeply aware that the over-rapid growth of population
was unfavourable to economic and social development and decided to energetically carry out
family planning in both urban and rural areas and integrated the plan for population
development into the plan of national economic and social development.").

2007]

SINGLED OUT

2157

promulgated a one-child policy to rein in population growth. 2 1 This section
discusses the many facets of China's coercive population control policy.
As its name implies, the one-child policy prohibits couples from having
more than one child. 22 The policy places stringent conditions on the birth
of children. First, couples must be married and must apply for a birth
permit before conceiving a child.2 3 After giving birth to one child, women
24
must use intrauterine devices (IUDs) to prevent further pregnancies.
Women must submit to routine pregnancy tests to ensure that the IUD
functions properly. 25 If a woman becomes pregnant with an unauthorized
child, her pregnancy must be terminated. 26 Furthermore, one or both
parents of multiple children may undergo forced sterilization to prevent the
birth of future children. 2 7 Thus, the government heavily regulates all stages
of childbirth, from conception to delivery.

21. Elisabeth Croll, Introduction: Fertility Norms and Family Size in China, in China's
One-Child Family Policy 1, 3, 24 (Elisabeth Croll, Delia Davin & Penny Kane eds., 1985).
In 1982, China's population topped one billion. The Chinese government ambitiously hoped
to reach zero population growth by the year 2000, or 1.2 billion people, a net increase of
only 200 million people over eighteen years. See Penny Kane & Ching Y Choi, China's One
Child Family Policy, 319 Brit. Med. J. 992, 992 (1999).
22. Croll, supra note 21, at 27-28. The name is somewhat of a misnomer as local laws
generally allow married couples to have a second child under certain circumstances. For
example, a local ordinance in Beijing authorizes married couples to have a second child if
(1) their first child is disabled, but not genetically disabled, and cannot become a "normal"
laborer; (2) both husband and wife are only children and they have one child; (3) the married
couple adopted a child because they thought themselves barren, but later became pregnant;
(4) in a second marriage, both husband and wife have only one child; (5) both parents are
racial minorities; (6) a rural male marries a female who has no brothers and agrees to support
his wife's family in old age; (7) the parents live in a rural area and are injured soldiers; or (8)
the parents are farmers living in remote mountains, have only a daughter, and have
difficulties that would be alleviated by a second child (presumably a son). Regulation of
Beijing Municipality on Population and Family Planning (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. People's Cong. of Beijing Municipality, July 18, 2003, effective July 18, 2003), art.
17, translatedin LexisNexis, Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws [hereinafter Beijing Family
Planning Law]. A couple may otherwise apply for governmental permission to have a
second child, but the first child must attain a specified age before the second child is born.
Id. art. 18.
23. 135 Cong. Rec. S8160, 8241 (daily ed. July 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. William
Armstrong) (commenting that abortions are mandatory for unwed Chinese mothers because
"illegitimacy is illegal"); Skalla, supra note 18, at 336.
24. Li, supra note 19, at 153 (summarizing provisions of the Hunan and Shandong
regions' local family planning regulations).
25. See Coercive Population Control in China: New Evidence of Forced Abortion and
Forced Sterilization: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 26
(2001) [hereinafter Coercive Population Control Hearing](prepared statement of Harry Wu,
Dir., Laogai Research Found.) (reporting that women in Tianjin municipality must undergo
urine tests every three months to ensure that they have not conceived a second child).
26. Li, supra note 19, at 153.
27. Coercive Population Control Hearing, supra note 25, at 25 (prepared statement of
Harry Wu) ("A newly-married couple is given one quota, or permission to bear one child.
Upon the birth of their first child, endless 'precautions' begin to prevent a second birth. If
their first child is female, they may have a second child with permission from authorities ....
Unconditional sterilization follows to rule out further births.").
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Marriage restrictions are intimately tied to the population control
program. 28 National law prevents men under the age of twenty-two and
women under the age of twenty from legally marrying. 29 The Marriage
Law has serious implications for young couples: The one-child policy
forbids unmarried couples (or single women) from having any children, but
the Marriage Law would also prevent them from marrying to legitimize the
pregnancy. 30 Therefore, an unmarried man and woman under the ages of
twenty-two and twenty, respectively, who conceive a child, automatically
violate the one-child policy, resulting in forced abortion.
The government implemented the one-child policy in 1979, but it did not
officially codify the ban until 2001. 3 1 For over twenty years, the only
positive law related to the one-child policy derived from general
declarations in the 1980 Marriage Law-which states that both husband and
wife have a legal duty to practice family planning 32-and in the 1982
Constitution-which includes an affirmative duty to follow family planning
procedures. 33 In 2001, the government formalized the one-child policy by
passing the Law of the People's Republic of China on Population and
28. Some courts and commentators view marriage and birth restrictions as distinct;
taken at face value, minimum age requirements for marriage are legitimate and
internationally accepted. See, e.g., Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2004)
(pointing out that every state sets minimum age requirements, and even though China's
minimum ages are higher than those in the United States, "we cannot go so far as to say that
enforcement of these [marriage] laws necessarily amounts to persecution"). However, China
enacted a national marriage age specifically to prevent couples from reproducing early in
life; thus, the biological window for reproduction shortens, and couples reproduce less often.
When viewed in context, China's Marriage Law is an integral part of its overall coercive
population control program. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that China's Marriage Law plays an important role in population control); Li v. Ashcroft,
356 F.3d 1153, 1159 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
29. Marriage Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 10,
1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981), art. 5, translated in Law in the People's Republic of China:
Commentary, Readings and Materials 380, 380 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds.,
1989) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Marriage Law]. These are minimum age requirements; localities
can set higher limits. See, e.g., infra note 111 (describing a case where the petitioner claimed
that his locality required men to be twenty-five and women twenty-three in order to legally
marry).
30. ForcedAbortion and Sterilization in China: The View From the Inside: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int'l
Relations, 105th Cong. 7 (1998) [hereinafter ForcedAbortion Hearing](statement of Nicole
Hess, Laogai Research Found.); see Jiali Li, China'sOne Child Policy: How and How Well
Has It Worked? A Case Study of Hebei Province, 1979-88, 21 Population & Dev. Rev. 563,
564 (1995) (stating that both illegally married couples and unwed couples are punished if
they conceive).
31. Before codification, the law governing family planning existed "as an amalgam of
constitutional duties, regulations of the Ministry of Health, state policies, [Communist] Party
policies, Party enactments, provincial policies, provincial administrative regulations, and
local supplementary regulations." Mark Savage, The Law ofAbortion in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China: Women's Rights in Two Socialist
Countries,in Law in the People's Republic of China: Commentary, Readings and Materials,
supra note 29, at 408, 408.
32. Marriage Law, supra note 29, art. 12.
33. Xian fa [Constitution] art. 49 (1982) (P.R.C.), translated in Law in the People's
Republic of China: Commentary, Readings and Materials, supra note 29, at 945, 954.
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Family Planning. 34 Since 2001, the Chinese government has legally
propagated a comprehensive population control policy which includes
provisions to prevent young marriages, 3 5 out-of-wedlock births, 36 and
multiple births. In the years since its inception, China's family size
37
restrictions have proved extremely effective.
B. Non-Coercive and Coercive Enforcement of the One-ChildPolicy
The Chinese government employs a variety of tools to enforce the onechild policy, including propaganda, incentives, disincentives, and coercion.
Although the national government created the one-child policy, the Family
Planning Law delegates responsibility for implementation to local
authorities. 38 Many localities set birth quotas and work diligently to ensure
they meet targets; 39 the pressure to meet these quotas underscores the

34. Law on Population and Family Planning (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002), translated in LexisNexis,
Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws [hereinafter Family Planning Law]. The national law
delegates responsibility for implementation of family planning objectives to local
governments. Id. art. 10.
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (linking the Marriage Law with China's
population control policy).
36. See Luo Lin et al., Induced Abortion Among Unmarried Women in Sichuan
Province, China, 51 Contraception 59, 61 (1995) ("[T]he primary reason why unmarried
women undergo induced abortions is simply because they are unmarried, and premarital
fertility is still considered unacceptable.").
37. See infra Part I.B for further discussion of enforcement techniques used to ensure
compliance with the one-child policy. Chinese officials credit the one-child policy with
preventing over 400 million births. China's Family Planning Policy Prevents 400 Million
Births,
Xinhua
Gen.
News
Service,
Nov.
9,
2006,
available at
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/09/content_5309779.htm.
However, the onechild policy has had unintended results. Due to a cultural preference for male heirs, couples
who can only have one child often take desperate measures to ensure that it is a boy. The
Family Planning Law banned the use of ultrasound technology to discover the sex of a fetus
so that women would not abort otherwise healthy and legal girls. Family Planning Law,
supra note 34, art. 35. Nonetheless, reports of female infanticide are not uncommon. See
Amy Hampton, Comment, Population Control in China: SacrificingHuman Rights for the
Greater Good?, 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 321, 340-41 (2003) (summarizing the rise of
infanticide practices after the adoption of the one-child policy). Consequently, China's sex
ratio is heavily skewed towards men. See John Pomfret, In China's Countryside, 'It's a
Boy!' Too Often, Wash. Post, May 29, 2001, at A1.
38. Family Planning Law, supra note 34, art. 10. For example, Beijing municipality
passed a law providing for local mass media broadcasting of family planning propaganda,
sex education in schools, setting target population levels in the city, family planning medical
facilities, dissemination of free contraceptives, economic rewards for compliance, and
punishments for violation of the one-child policy. Beijing Family Planning Law, supra note
22, arts. 8-12, 20-21, 29, 31, 38-43.
39. Thomas L. Hunker, Generational Genocide: Coercive Population Control as a
Basis for Asylum in the United States, 15 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 131, 134 (2005) (noting
that 1900 of China's 2800 counties set birth control targets and quotas); Li, supra note 30, at
563 (describing the top-down process of setting national population goals, delegating local
officials to set birth quotas, and doling out birth allowances among couples wishing to
conceive legally).
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necessity of effective enforcement. 40 However, because local authorities
set quotas, enforcement of the one-child policy varies among regions,
particularly between urban and rural areas. 4 1 Despite these variances,
enforcement of the one-child policy generally includes a first-line attempt
to encourage families to have fewer children, followed by more severe
efforts if illegal pregnancies persist. This section first addresses noncoercive, mainly economic enforcement methods, then contrasts the use of
physical force and coercion to ensure compliance with the one-child policy.
1. Conditioning Economic Benefits on Conformity with Family Planning
Directives
The Chinese government attempts to encourage single child families
using economic pressure and rewards. Elisabeth Croll characterized this as
a scheme "to encourage a preference for one child only [by] reduc[ing] the
cost of [the] first child and dramatically increas[ing] the cost of subsequent
children." 42 Couples who agree to have one child qualify for a certificate
43
that entitles them to subsidized medical care and education for the child,
better housing or farmland plots, and cash rewards. 44 Thus, incentives aim
to prevent out-of-plan pregnancies before women even conceive.
On the other hand, couples who forego incentives to have an
unauthorized child bear heavy economic costs. They must pay fines to
45
compensate the state for the burden imposed by any extra children.
Whereas single child families receive medical care and education, a family
who violates the one-child policy is responsible for all these expenses for

40. See Gerrie Zhang, Comment, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the
People's Republic of China, 18 Hous. J. Int'l L. 557, 568-69 (1996) (noting that the pressure
to meet population growth goals can result in abuses of enforcement power).
41. For example, rural officials may grant exceptions to the one-child policy for families
who need more children, preferably male, to work on farmland. Conversely, the government
monitors childbirths more carefully in densely populated urban areas. See Croll, supra note
21, at 28; Erin Bergeson Hull, Note, When Is the UnmarriedPartnerof an Alien Who Has
Been Forcibly Subjected to Abortion or Sterilization a "Spouse "for the Purpose of Asylum
Eligibility? The DivergingOpinions of Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft, 2005 Utah L.
Rev. 1021, 1024 (summarizing the different levels of enforcement among urban and rural
areas).
42. Croll, supra note 21, at 29.
43. See Beijing Family Planning Law, supra note 22, at art. 21(3) (specifying that the
husband's and/or wife's employer must cover medical and educational costs for the onechild certified family).
44. The Beijing Family Planning Law provides that each certified one-child family will
receive a ten renminbi (RMB) cash award for every month from the time of certification
until the child turns eighteen. Id. art. 2 1(1).
45. Croll, supra note 21, at 30 (noting that employers can deduct five to ten percent of
an offending couple's income per year for up to sixteen years after the birth of a second
child); see Human Rights Hearing,supra note 4, at 23 (prepared statement of Hon. Arthur E.
Dewey, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of
State) (describing the large fees and penalties associated with one-child policy violations as
"tantamount to coercion"); Skalla, supra note 18, at 338-39 (describing fine structures in
various provinces).
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the unlawful child.4 6 The family also forfeits housing and cash benefits
bestowed on single-child certified families; furthermore, if a certified
family breaks its promise to have only one child, it must repay the value of
the rewards received for the first child. 47 Economic incentives and the
corresponding penalties are powerful motivators for couples to voluntarily
respect family size mandates.
2. Intimidation and Physical Force to Limit Family Size
Officials employ a variety of techniques ranging from propaganda and
social pressure to physical force to "convince" women to terminate out-ofplan pregnancies. Despite the government's position that compliance with
enforcement morphs
the one-child policy is voluntary, 4 8 in many cases
50
from economic incentives 49 to outright coercion:
"There are cases in China where brute force is used to perform abortion
and sterilization. But more commonly, the Chinese government abides by
its own Orwellian definition of voluntary, which is to say that you can
fine the woman; you can lock her up; you can subject her to morning-tonight brainwashing sessions; you can cut off the electricity to her house;
you can fire her from her job ....All of this psychological mauling,
sleep deprivation, arrest, and grueling mistreatment is inflicted upon these
women in order to break their will to resist. But as long as the pregnant
women walk the last few steps to the local medical clinic under their own
abortions that follow are said by the government to be
power, then the
'voluntary." 5 1
Family planning officials may use advertising campaigns to promote
sustainable population growth by encouraging citizens to subjugate their
own desires for children to the needs of their country. 52 Local officials
46. Croll, supra note 21, at 30.
47. Id.
48. Zhang, supra note 40, at 570 ("[T]he central authorities denounce coercion and
announce that the family planning policy is voluntary but require that population targets...
continue to be met."). The ideal of families freely deciding to limit themselves to one child
for the good of their country is inconsistent with the penalties provided in local law and the
wide latitude officials have to enforce the policy.
49. Officials may use noncoercive enforcement tools to manipulate families to comply
with one-child mandates. For example, propaganda campaigns paint the one-child
certificate as a badge of honor, creating a powerful social stigma around multiple-child
families. See Hampton, supra note 37, at 334 (stating that couples who violate the one-child
policy "'are maligned as irresponsible free-riders in the eyes of the public"' (quoting James
Z. Lee & Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese
Realities, 1700-2000, at 134 (1999))).
50. The Chinese government denies the use of coercion in enforcing the one-child
policy. See White Paper, supra note 15, pts. III, VII (affirming that compliance with the onechild policy is voluntary and that the family planning laws comply with international human
rights standards).
51. Scott Weinberg, An End to the One-Child Quota?, Catholic World Rep., Feb. 2000,
at 44 (quoting Steven Mosher, Population Research Inst., Address at Conference on Human
Rights in China (1999)).
52. See Zhang, supra note 40, at 563-64; see also Hunker, supra note 39, at 134
("Propaganda campaigns describe the choice to abort or to become sterilized as honorable in
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employ more targeted social pressure to intimidate and humiliate women;
for example, authorities publicly monitor their menstrual periods, visit their
homes, and force them to attend mandatory family planning study
sessions. 53 This pressure can effectively shame women into reporting to a
clinic for an abortion.
If social pressure fails, there have been numerous cases of documented,
even if unauthorized, uses of physical force to coerce women into abiding
by the one-child policy. A network of informants spy on women of
childbearing age and report unauthorized pregnancies to family planning
officials. 54 Officials in Tianjin municipality then employ a strategy known
as "killing the chicken to 'scare the monkey," whereby they raze the home
of a family who violates the one-child policy and bring all of the women of
childbearing age in the area to watch. 5 5 Physical force extends beyond
property damage and arrest to mandatory abortion. One victim testified that
local officials ordered her to abort her second child when she was six-anda-half-months pregnant; when she refused, they threatened to fire her from
her job, levy a substantial fine, and deny the unborn child a residence
permit. 56 When she again refused and begged to keep her child, officials
accosted her at her home and brought her to an abortion clinic. 57 There,
nurses restrained her while they injected a drug through her abdomen into
the fetus, killing it; they then delivered the dead fetus by physically pushing
58
against the mother's stomach to move the body through the birth canal.
Countless families have thus come to comply with the one-child policy.
The complex system of incentives and punishment successfully prevents
couples from having more than one child.
C. U.S. Asylum Legislation in Response to China's One-ChildPolicy
In light of mounting opposition to Chinese human rights abuses, U.S.
policymakers reversed the country's closed-door policy by creating legal
order to create psychological pressure for those contemplating the decision to have another
child [to reconsider]."). These campaigns are reminiscent of the 1970s "wan, xi, shao"
(later, longer, fewer) propaganda aimed at promoting later marriages, spacing between
births, and fewer children. See Zhang, supra note 40, at 561.
53. See Coercive Population ControlHearing,supra note 25, at 16 (statement of Steven
W. Mosher, Population Research Inst.); Forced Abortion Hearing, supra note 30, at 2
(statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, House Comm. on Int'l Relations)
(discussing the intense psychological pressure employers, family, and friends place on
women in violation of the one-child policy to convince them to abort the unauthorized
fetus); Li, supra note 19, at 154; Beech, supra note 1, at 61 (chronicling punishments such as
fines, beatings, and study sessions in Linyi, China).
54. See Forced Abortion Hearing,supra note 30, at 3 (statement of Rep. Christopher
Smith, Chairman, House Comm. on Int'l Relations) (testifying that local Chinese officials
use a network of paid informants who report unauthorized pregnancies of neighbors,
relatives, and friends).
55. Coercive Population Control Hearing, supra note 25, at 25 (prepared statement of
Harry Wu).
56. Id. at 27 (statement of Mahire Omerjan).
57. Id. at 28.
58. Id.
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asylum protection for victims of the one-child policy. This section outlines
the political struggle to form specific immigration legislation covering
Chinese nationals fleeing coercive population control.
In May 1989, the BIA had issued a decision effectively closing U.S.
59
borders to Chinese refugees fleeing the one-child policy. In In re Chang,
the BIA denied asylum to an applicant fleeing China's population control
measures. The BIA stated outright, "We do not find that the 'one couple,
'60
one child' policy of the Chinese government is on its face persecutive.
Instead, the BIA required an asylum applicant to establish that the Chinese
government had selectively applied its coercive population control policy to
the applicant because he or she belonged to a particular religion or minority
group, or expressed unpopular political opinion. 6 1 However, mere weeks
after the BIA's decision in Chang, the Chinese government sent army tanks
to quell unarmed students and intellectuals protesting against the
Communist Party in Tiananmen Square; in twenty-four hours soldiers killed
anywhere from 1000 to 5000 civilians in what is universally recognized as a
bloody massacre. 62 This event only magnified the disregard of human
rights under China's coercive population control regime. In response, U.S.
policymakers wanted to take official action to express American
disapproval of human rights abuses in China.6 3 They chose to counter
China's human rights violations by reconsidering U.S. immigration
policy. 64 The turmoil of June 1989 thus ignited a seven year struggle in
Congress to override Chang and provide comprehensive legal protection for
the victims of the Chinese government's human rights abuses. 65
Congress and the Executive branch made several attempts to legally
protect victims of China's one-child policy. The House of Representatives
and the Senate passed the Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment to the
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 in order to overrule In
re Chang's determination that the one-child policy was not a program of
59. 20 1. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989).
60. Id. at 43.
61. Id. at 44. Under Chang, an applicant could only show that he or she had been
persecuted by demonstrating that the government had threatened to punish him or her in
particularfor violating the one-child policy. Id.
62. David Aikman, The Battle of Beijing, in Tiananmen:
China's Struggle for
Democracy: Its Prelude, Development, Aftermath, and Impact 81, 118-19 (Winston L. Y.

Yang & Marsha L. Wagner eds., 1990).
63. In 1995, the House of Representatives clarified its thought process in ultimately

deciding to protect Chinese nationals by amending U.S. immigration law:
The Committee believes that ...policies of coercive family planning are "laws

of general application" motivated by concerns over population growth [and are
persecutory].

The BIA opinion [in Chang] effectively precludes from protection

persons who have been submitted to undeniable and grotesque violations of
fundamental human rights....
The United States should not deny protection to persons subjected to such
treatment.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(1), at 174 (1996).
64. See id.
65. Paula Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy,
14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 881, 886 (2000).
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persecution. 66 However, President George H. W. Bush vetoed the Act in
favor of executive action he claimed would achieve Congress's goals while
allowing him to manage foreign relations with China. 67 He directed
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to give enhanced consideration to
refugees who express a fear of persecution due to coercive population
control measures including forced abortion and sterilization. 68 As Professor
Paula Abrams dryly observed, "For the next three years, the Executive
embarked on a series of bungled attempts to provide this 'enhanced
consideration.' 69 The Attorney General issued an interim rule providing
that refugees fleeing their home country to avoid forced abortion or
sterilization can establish political persecution; 70 .President Bush's
Executive Order No. 12,71171 incorporated this rule. 72 Despite these
gestures, the final published rule made no mention of asylum for refugees
fleeing coercive population control. 73 Therefore, on the last day of George
H. W. Bush's Administration, Attorney General William Barr signed
another final rule explicitly designating victims of the one-child policy as
deserving of refugee status. 74 The incoming Administration of President
William Jefferson Clinton prevented the second final rule from being
published. 75 Uncertain as to the precedential value of In re Chang after this
executive branch back-and-forth, the BIA certified its decision for review
by Attorney General Janet Reno; she declined to offer guidance. 76 At this
point, the U.S. government's stance on the level of security to offer Chinese

66. See 135 Cong. Rec. S8160, 8241 (daily ed. July 19, 1989) (proposing an amendment
to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, due to the severe consequences associated with
the Chinese government's unrelenting population control policy, so that "all adjudicators of
asylum or refugee status shall give fullest possible consideration to applications from
nationals of the People's Republic of China who express a fear of persecution... because
they refuse to abort a pregnancy or resist sterilization in violation of Chinese Communist
Party directives on population"); see also Abrams, supra note 65, at 886.
67. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Bill Providing Emergency Chinese
Immigration Relief, 2 Pub. Papers 1611 (Nov. 30, 1989).
68. President George H. W. Bush noted that he "deplore[d] the violence and repression
employed in the Tiananmen events," but that executive action would similarly achieve
Congress's "laudable objectives" in proposing the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief
Act. Id. at 1612; see Abrams, supra note 65, at 886.
69. Abrams, supra note 65, at 886.
70. Refugee Status, Withholding of Deportation, and Asylum; Burden of Proof, 55 Fed.
Reg. 2803 (Jan. 29, 1990).
71. Policy Implementation With Respect to Nationals of the People's Republic of China,
Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (Apr. 13, 1990).
72. See Hunker, supra note 39, at 140.
73. See Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,674 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, 253);
Hunker, supra note 39, at 140.
74. See Abrams, supra note 65, at 886.
75. See Hunker, supra note 39, at 140; see also Regulatory Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074

(Jan. 25, 1993) (requesting that President Clinton's appointees approve all new regulations
before they are published).
76. See Abrams, supra note 65, at 887.
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nationals persecuted under a coercive population control regime seemed
77
unclear.
Finally, in 1996 Congress took definitive action to protect Chinese
nationals by passing section 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act. 78 This statute aimed to provide definitive
protection for refugees persecuted by coercive family planning policies. 79
D. The IIRIRA and a New Definition of "Refugee"
This section presents the IIRIRA's definition of refugee, which Congress
broadened to include victims of the one-child policy. Generally, to qualify
for asylum, an alien applicant must show that he or she is a refugee under
the Immigration and Naturalization Act.8 0 Section 601 of the IIRIRA
amended this definition to specifically address the question of one-child
8
policy refugees: '
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo.
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal
to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on
account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear
that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed 82to have
a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
The IIRIRA originally capped the number of refugees granted asylum on
83
grounds of persecution by coercive population control to 1000 per year.
However, the Real ID Act of 2005 abolished this limitation. 84 Now, there
is no specific cap on the number of Chinese refugees fleeing the one-child
policy that can obtain asylum in the United States under section 601 of the
IIRIRA. 85 In passing the IIRIRA, the U.S. government gave heightened

consideration for victims of China's coercive population control policies.

77. In many cases, the BIA continued to apply Chang to Chinese nationals claiming
persecution under the one-child policy. See, e.g., In re G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 764 (B.I.A. 1993).
78. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(B) (2000)).

79. See Abrams, supra note 65, at 884.
80. See supra note 8 for the statutory definition of a refugee.
81. Congress's expansion of the refugee designation in effect overruled the BIA's
holding in In re Chang. See Abrams, supra note 65, at 885.
82. IIRIRA § 601(a)(1).
83. Id. § 60 1(b).
84. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 101(g)(2), 119 Stat. 231
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1 157(a)(5) (2000)).
85. In 2003, about 14,000 Chinese refugees applied for asylum; approximately 7000 of

those refugees based their application on persecution due to China's coercive population
control measures. Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek
Asylum in America from China's One-Child Policy, Legal Aff., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 8, 9,
available

at

novdec05.msp.

http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2005/scene-chen_
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E. DerivativeAsylum Rights for the Spouses of Chinese Nationals
Persecutedby the One-Child Policy: The Case of In re C-Y-ZThe BIA's interpretation of the IIRIRA further expanded asylum rights
for Chinese nationals fleeing coercive population control. The BIA
addressed the question of extending asylum to a Chinese national who had
not personally suffered a forced abortion or sterilization as a consequence
of violating the one-child policy in In re C-Y-Z-. 86 This section presents the
facts and procedural history of the landmark case, the BIA's opinion, and
potential rationales in support of the BIA's finding.
In In re C-Y-Z-, the petitioner and his wife twice violated Chinese
restrictions on family size. The couple had a traditional marriage in 1986.87
After the birth of their first daughter, local officials forced the applicant's
wife to wear an IUD to prevent the birth of more children. 8 8 The applicant
protested against the IUD, for which he was arrested. 89 Eventually, his
wife illegally removed her IUD, and the couple became pregnant with a
second daughter; 90 local officials fined them for this birth. 9 1 The
applicant's wife subsequently conceived again, giving birth to a son while
hiding in the countryside. 92 Upon learning that the couple again ignored
the one-child policy, local officials came to the applicant's house in the
middle of the night and escorted his wife to a clinic where she was forcibly
later, the applicant left China and requested
sterilized. 93 Eighteen months
94
asylum in the United States.
In support of his asylum application, the candidate produced
unauthenticated copies of his marriage certificate, birth certificates for his
three children, a document certifying his fine for having the second child,
and a document stating that his wife underwent sterilization after the birth
of their third child.9 5 The immigration judge did not make an adverse
credibility finding regarding the applicant's testimony or documentary
86. 21 1. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997).
87. Id. Although the BIA did not comment on the matter, note that the applicant and his
wife did not register their marriage until 1991-around the time of the birth of their third
child-and thus they were not legally married during much of the time they were persecuted.
Id. at 915 n.2.
88. Id. at 916.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 932 (Vacca, Board Member, dissenting).
91. Id. at 916. Officials ordered the applicant's wife to abort their second child, but she
hid with relatives in order to carry the pregnancy to tenn. Id. When she emerged from
hiding with the second child, officials fined them 2000 RMB, or the equivalent of three
month's salary, which the applicant paid so that birth control cadres would not destroy his
house. Id.
92. The applicant testified that he knew they had violated the one-child policy, but they
were willing to take their chances to have a son. Id. This reflects a common preference
among Chinese citizens for male progeny. See supra note 37 regarding the consequences of
gender preference in light of one-child restrictions.
93. InreC-Y-Z-,21 I.&N. at930.
94. Id. at 916. The applicant's wife and three children remained in China, a fact the
immigration judge weighed heavily against him. See id.
95. Id.

2007]

SINGLED OUT

2167

evidence. 96 Instead, the immigration judge denied his application because
the Chinese government did not persecute the applicant directly. 9 7 The
judge expressed an unwillingness to allow the applicant to "ride on his
wife's coattails or claim asylum because of alleged adverse factors to his
wife, including forced sterilization... [when] [h]e, himself, has never been
'98
persecuted.
The applicant appealed his denial of asylum to the BIA. 99 Relying
heavily on a Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the BIA agreed that "the husband
of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes and make a bona fide
and non-frivolous application for asylum based on problems impacting
more intimately on her than on him." 10 0 Therefore, the BIA overturned the
immigration judge's decision, holding that persecution of one spouse can be
established on the basis of forced abortion or sterilization 1 1 suffered by the
96. The judge specifically "put[] aside any questions [he] might have as to whether the
applicant has been completely truthful.., whether he has embellished or puffed the story to
make it seem more than it is." Id. The immigration judge is in the best position to make
credibility determinations, but the BIA may decide that evidence accepted by the
immigration judge is, in fact, legally insufficient. See Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885,
888-89 (9th Cir. 1985). If neither the immigration judge nor the BIA makes an adverse
credibility finding, courts have traditionally presumed the applicant to be credible. Id.; see
Leiva-Montalvo v. INS, 173 F.3d 749, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to remand an El
Salvadorian refugee's case to the BIA to determine the credibility of his testimony when
both the immigration judge and the BIA failed to do so originally). However, the Real ID
Act of 2005 restricted courts' discretion so that if there is no credibility determination, the
applicant is entitled only to a rebuttable presumption of credibility. Real ID Act of 2005 §
101(a)(3)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2000). This Act codified much of the case law
concerning credibility determinations and the burden of proof. Currently, an asylum
applicant may establish a well-founded fear of persecution by his or her testimony alone if
that testimony provides consistent, specific, and credible details; evidence corroborating his
or her story, or an explanation for its absence, may be required where it would reasonably be
expected. Id. at § 101(a)(3)(ii). The judge should base an adverse credibility finding on any
"inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony"-even if these inconsistencies do not go to the heart of the asylum claim; but, "failure of proof
is not a proper ground per se for an adverse credibility determination." In re S-M-J-, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 722, 731 (1997); see Real ID Act of 2005 § 101(a)(3)(iii). To support a finding that
the applicant failed to meet his or her burden of proof, the BIA must: (1) explicitly rule on
the applicant's credibility; (2) explain why they reasonably expect corroborating evidence to
support the applicant's testimony; and (3) evaluate the sufficiency of the applicant's
explanation for why he or she cannot produce corroborating evidence. Diallo v. INS, 232
F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000); cf Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that corroborating evidence is unnecessary if the asylum applicant provides credible
testimony).
97. The BIA did not consider his brief arrest for protesting against his wife's intrauterine
device (IUD). In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. at 916.
98. Id.
99. During the pendency of his appeal, Congress passed section 601 of the IIRIRA. Id.
at 917.
100. Id. at 918.
101. This Note uses gender neutral language. Although no cases to date have addressed
the problem of asylum rights for women based on the forcible sterilization of their husbands
or partners, that scenario is theoretically possible. All of the cases discussed in this Note,
however, concern men applying for asylum based on a woman's forced abortion or
sterilization.
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other spouse. 10 2 The applicant
in In re C-Y-Z- won asylum due to his
03
wife's forced sterilization.
Unfortunately for circuit courts, the BIA's opinion did not expressly
explain the rationale for imputing persecution from one spouse to
another. 10 4 However, then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito posited two
explanations. First, it may be that witnessing the forced abortion or
sterilization of a spouse causes the other spouse to "experience intense
sympathetic suffering that rises to the level of persecution."' 1 5 Or, the BIA
may have reasoned that a forced sterilization or abortion directly impacts
the other spouse's rights to procreate and raise children and thus constitutes
persecution. 0 6 The BIA's exact rationale may not be determinative since
circuit courts ultimately decide whether the BIA's interpretation of the
IRIRA should govern future asylum seekers. Nonetheless, the BIA's
vagueness has made the circuit courts' decisions whether or not to defer to
In re C-Y-Z- more difficult; one court simply refused to address the matter
without more substantive reasoning from the BIA. 10 7 The BIA finally
102. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I.&N. at 919.
103. Although the BIA granted petitioner's request for asylum, this case provoked a
series of concurring and dissenting opinions demonstrating the Board's fragmented view.
One Board Member wrote separately to support the legitimacy of imputed political opinion.
Id. at 922 (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring). Another argued that the infliction of a
forced abortion or sterilization on one spouse should only imply that the other spouse has
been persecuted when "a couple... jointly want[ed] more children and oppose[d] their
government's efforts to restrict family size. In these circumstances, the sterilization of one
spouse adversely affects both." Id. at 928-29 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring in part). If
the husband is satisfied with the size of his family and does not oppose the one-child policy,
then he should not gain asylum based on his wife's persecution, even if his wife adamantly
opposes the coercive population control program. Id. at 929. Dissenting members opposed
imputing persecution from one spouse to another. Id. at 933 (Vacca, Board Member,
dissenting). "-[I]mputedpast persecution' based on the past persecution of the applicant's
wife defies the rules of statutory construction ....
If Congress had desired to include
spouses of individuals who had been forced to undergo involuntary abortion or sterilization
procedures, they would have done so expressly in the [IIRIRA]." Id.
104. Some time after issuing the decision, the Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service certified In re C-Y-Z- for review by the Attorney General, but in
2004, John Ashcroft refused to offer guidance. In re C-Y-Z-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 693 (A.G.
2004). In spite of this and numerous other requests for clarification, the BIA remained silent
on its justification for the In re C-Y-Z- decision for almost ten years. See Lin v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding a series of cases in an attempt to force the
BIA to shed light on its rationale for imputed persecution for married spouses); see also
Hull, supra note 41, at 1044-45 (arguing that circuit courts would continue to grapple with
the "unspecific and inconsistently applied holding of In re C-Y-Z-" until the BIA fully
explains its position). But see infra Part II.C (discussing the BIA's reaffirmation of In re CY-Z-).
105. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 226. Although the courts lament the obscurity of In re C-Y-Z-'s rationale, in
other contexts they have been willing to accept the concept of imputed persecution. For
example, in Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit granted asylum to an Ethiopian woman based on the possibility that her
daughter would suffer female genital mutilation if they returned to their home country.
There, just as in In re C-Y-Z-, the applicant herself was unharmed, but she won asylum based
on another's persecution.
107. Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005); see infra Part II.B.2.
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issued a decision elucidating its resolution to deny derivative asylum to
unmarried Chinese nationals in 2006.108 It remains to be seen whether this
more detailed explanation can persuade future circuit courts to sustain
marital status distinctions in one-child policy cases.
The In re C-Y-Z- decision has had a tremendous impact on the rights of
Chinese refugees applying for asylum in the United States. Although the
language of In re C-Y-Z- does not explicitly deny imputed asylum rights to
unmarried partners, since 1997 the BIA has never granted asylum to onechild policy refugees who were not legally married in China.' 0 9 The
controversial decision in In re C-Y-Z- influences circuit courts as they
consider appeals from refugees denied asylum under that precedent.
II. U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND THE FATE OF UNMARRIED CHINESE
APPLICANTS

Section 601 of the IIRIRA extends asylum rights to Chinese refugees
who have been personally persecuted by China's one-child policy. The
BIA's decision to grant asylum to a refugee based on his spouse's forced
abortion created asylum rights for Chinese refugees who were not
themselves victims of the one-child policy; this decision guides U.S. circuit
courts as they consider asylum fights for the unmarried partners of Chinese
refugees. This part traces various interpretations of the BIA's decision In
re C-Y-Z- through a series of circuit court cases. Part II.A begins by
analyzing opinions from the majority of circuits, which traditionally have
refused to impute persecution among unmarried couples in accordance with
the BIA's administrative interpretation of the IIRIRA. Part II.B then
contrasts the majority's deferential decisions with two circuit court
decisions in which the courts did not align themselves with the BIA's
decision in In re C-Y-Z-. Finally, Part II.C examines the BIA's recent,
long-delayed reconsideration of In re C-Y-Z-.
A. The Majority: No DerivativeAsylum Rights for UnmarriedChinese
Applicants in Deference to the BIA's Interpretationof the IIRIRA
The majority of circuit courts have denied asylum appeals from
unmarried Chinese applicants seeking refuge in the United States based on
their partners' forced abortions or sterilizations, interpreting In re C-Y-Z- to
apply strictly to married spouses. This section presents cases from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits denying
asylum to unmarried Chinese applicants. All of the couples discussed
herein were too young to legally marry when they conceived and suffered
forced abortions. Although the courts refer to these couples using varied
108. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 8 (B.I.A. 2006) (explaining the unique position of

married couples vis-A-vis persecution when one spouse suffers forced abortion or
sterilization); see infra Part II.C.
109. Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App'x 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying asylum to an
unmarried refugee based on his girlfriend's forced abortion because the "BIA has never
extended the C-Y-Z- rule to unmarried couples").
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titles such as "fianc6/fianc~e," "boyfriend/girlfriend," and "partner," all of
the couples herein expressed at least a desire to marry, if not an actual
attempt. Regardless of their intent, however, most courts have refused to
impute the persecution of one partner to another applying for asylum in the
United States in the absence of a legal marriage.
1. The Third Circuit in Chen v. Ashcroft
In Chen v. Ashcrofi"1 0 the Third Circuit deferred to the BIA's
interpretation of In re C-Y-Z- in refusing the petitioner's asylum
application. There, Cai Luan Chen and his fiancee conceived a child before
they reached the requisite age to legally marry in China."' When local
officials discovered the underage, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, they ordered
Chen's fiancee to undergo an abortion and threatened to arrest Chen if his
fiancee did not report for the procedure. 112 Chen subsequently fled China
and sought refuge in the United States." 3 Although Chen's fiancee
attempted to delay the sentence, local officials finally forced her to submit
to an abortion in her eighth month of pregnancy 114
Upon arrival in the United States, Chen applied for asylum and asked
that his fiancee's persecution be imputed to him under In re C-Y-Z-. 115
Chen argued that had they met the age requirements, the two would have
married, and consequently he would have been entitled to a presumption of
persecution based on his fianc6e's forced abortion. 1 6 The immigration
judge granted Chen's petition, even though Chen and his fianc6e were not
married, because his circumstances could be analogized to the facts of In re
C-Y-Z-. He noted,
[I]n this particular case, at least, where [Mr. Chen] and his fianc6e had
been living together for some time and where they were not technically
married only due to the fact that their right under international law to
enter into a marriage was violated in that they were prohibited from
110. 381 F.3d 221.
111. Id. at 223. Cai Luan Chen was nineteen, and his fianc6e was eighteen when she
became pregnant. The 1980 Marriage Law specifies that women must be twenty and men
must be twenty-two to marry legally. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Chen
claimed that his locality set minimum age requirements of twenty-five for men and twentythree for women. Chen, 381 F.3d at 223. The couple would have had to wait six years to
legally marry and conceive.
112. Chen, 381 F.3d at 223.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 9, Chen, 381 F.3d 221 (No. 03-3124). Chen also
argued that he himself was a victim of the one-child policy because the denial of his right to
marry and the abortion of his child constituted past persecution. Id. The immigration judge
agreed, noting "[i]t is hard to imagine anything more painful and horrific than to have one's
child forcibly aborted by a ... law which.. . clearly ... [violates] ... human rights." Id. at 8
(alteration in original).
116. Id. at 7-8. Chen submitted a document attesting that his fianc6e had undergone an
abortion as proof of his persecution. Id. at 7. Neither the immigration judge nor the BIA
made an adverse credibility finding regarding the applicant's testimony or documentary
evidence. Id. at 15 n.3.
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registering their marriage under a Draconian law relating to marriage and
birth control... C-Y-Z- does apply ....
[T]hey would have been
husband and wife and ... the Court considers them to be husband and
wife.

117

Thus, the immigration judge extended the BIA's decision in In re C-Y-Z- to
include couples like Chen and his fiancee who would have married but for
the Marriage Law.
The BIA reversed this decision, asserting that In re C-Y-Z- limits grants
18
of asylum to the married spouses of victims of coercive family planning.'
Then-Circuit Judge Alito confirmed the BIA's interpretation of the IIRIRA
in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. 119 Chevron requires the courts
to defer to agency interpretation of a statute when Congress has delegated
general authority to the agency to administer that statute. 120 Once the court
determined that Congress delegated authority to the BIA to administer and
interpret immigration law, 12 1 it applied Chevron's two-step test to
determine what level of deference to bestow on the BIA's decision that the
IIRIRA does not apply to the unmarried partners of Chinese refugees forced
122
to undergo sterilization or abortion.
In step one of the Chevron test, the court must determine whether
Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent that the law be interpreted
in a specific way; if so, that interpretation controls. 12 3 But, "[i]f Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill," the courts move to step two,
a reasonableness test whereby agency interpretations "are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." 124 Since Congress did not discuss marital status when expanding
the definition of refugee under section 601 of the IIRIRA, the Chen court
rested its denial of asylum on the finding that the BIA's interpretation of the
125
IIRIRA in In re C-Y-Z- was not arbitrary or capricious.
The Chen court cited two rational basis justifications for the BIA's
bright-line rule regarding marital status in one-child policy refugee cases:
117. Id. at 7-8.
118. Chen, 381 F.3d at 235.
119. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. Id. at 842-43.
121. The court settled this issue quickly, stating that "there is no dispute that 'the BIA
should be accorded Chevron deference for its interpretations of the immigration laws."'
Chen, 381 F.3d at 224 (quoting Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 2003)).
122. Id. at 224.
123. Id.
124. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. The rationale for such deference is that "a statute's
ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps." Chen, 381 F.3d at 232 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
125. Chen, 381 F.3d at 227. Although Congress's intent in passing section 601 of the
ITRIRA does not address the question of marital status, the Third Circuit inferred from the
yearly cap on one-child policy refugees Congress's intent to provide a limited remedy. Id. at
232. Therefore, the court found that excluding unmarried Chinese refugees who were not
directly persecuted was consistent with congressional goals. Id. at 234.
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administrative convenience and fraud. 126 The Third Circuit posited that the
BIA may have chosen marital status as a limiting factor because applicants
can quickly and easily prove that they qualify by producing a marriage
certificate. 12 7 Furthermore, requiring asylum seekers to be married spares
the BIA from having to determine the closeness of the relationship between
the applicant and the actual victim.12 8 The Third Circuit found that the BIA

could have rationally concluded that using marital status as a bright-line test
in one-child policy cases promotes efficiency and avoids fraud. 129
Consequently, the Third Circuit awarded Chevron deference to the BIA's
decision that In re C-Y-Z- applies only to married couples and denied
Chen's petition for asylum based on his fiancee's forced abortion.
2. The Fifth Circuit in Zhang v. Ashcroft
In Zhang v. Ashcroft, 130 the Fifth Circuit denied an unmarried Chinese
refugee's application for asylum premised on his girlfriend's forced
abortion in accordance with a strict reading of In re C-Y-Z-. Here, the
applicant and his girlfriend were living together when she became
pregnant.131 After neighbors tipped off local officials to the out-of-wedlock
pregnancy, they forced the girlfriend to undergo an abortion. 132 Just before
126. Id. at 229. "[T]he statutory [marital status] distinction could be viewed as serving
two purposes: (1) providing a convenient way to weed out cases in which 'close family ties'
were lacking and (2) avoiding 'problems of proof and the potential for fraudulent visa
applications."' Id. at 228 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798, 799 n.8 (1977)
(upholding provisions that grant preferential immigration status to illegitimate children and
their mothers but not their fathers)). For a more extensive discussion of these policy
considerations, see infra Part IlI.B.
127. Chen, 381 F.3d at 228. This convenience of proof would allegedly ease the BIA's
overcrowded docket and avoid questions of paternity/maternity. But consider that marriage
certificates can be forged just as quickly and easily as they are legally produced. See infra
Part III.B.
128. Chen, 381 F.3d at 229. A marriage certificate thus serves as a proxy for an
individualized determination of the relationship between applicant and partner. See id. Such
generalizations about marital relationships may have convinced the BIA that "in general,
forced abortions and sterilization procedures tend to have a more severe impact on spouses
than on unmarried partners." Id.at 228-29.
129. Compare Judge Samuel Alito's willingness to substitute his judgment for the BIA's
with Lin v. United States Department of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). "The
government suggests that we may simply supply our own rationale for the BIA's decision in
C-Y-Z- and then act accordingly. But the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that '[i]t will
not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying [a particular] agency's
action; nor can a court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what the
agency has left vague and indecisive."' Id. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
196-97 (1947)).
130. 395 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2004).
131. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2004)
(No. 04-60183). Ru-Jian Zhang asserted that the couple wished to marry in China, but they
did not meet the requisite age limits set by the Marriage Law. Id.; see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
132. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 131, at 2. Besides the abortion, Zhang's
girlfriend was heavily fined for her illegal pregnancy; Zhang paid the fine. Brief for
Respondent at 4, Zhang, 395 F.3d 531 (No. 04-60183).
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her capture, Ru-Jian Zhang fled China and applied for asylum in the United
States. 133

The immigration judge denied Zhang's application because he could not
produce written proof that he fathered the aborted child. 134 The BIA
affirmed the immigration judge's decision based on its precedent limiting In
re C-Y-Z- to married couples. Because Zhang was "not legally married to
[his girlfriend], nor did he register or attempt to register his marriage in
accordance with legal requirements . .. [, nor did he] hold a traditional

ceremony and public wedding in the presence of family and friends," the
'1 35
BIA found that "he was not married in any official or unofficial sense.
Consequently, the Board refused Zhang's request for asylum.
Zhang appealed the BIA's order to the Fifth Circuit. In its succinct
opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decisions below. 136 The court
incorporated by reference the Third Circuit's reasoning in Chen, granting
Chevron deference to the BIA's decision to restrict asylum for Chinese
nationals claiming persecution based on a partner's forced sterilization or
abortion to married couples. 137 As Zhang and his girlfriend were not
married, he could not gain entry into the United States based on her forced
abortion.
3. The Seventh Circuit in Chen v. Gonzales
The Seventh Circuit declined to consider a Chinese applicant who could
not register his marriage to be legally married as required by In re C-Y-Z-,
138
and thus denied his asylum claim. The applicant in Chen v. Gonzales
attempted to marry his girlfriend in China, but the government denied them
a marriage license because they were too young.' 39 Five months later, his
girlfriend became pregnant:
One day while Zhi Zhi Chen was out,
authorities came to the home where they lived and ordered her to appear at
a clinic for an abortion. 140 An outraged Chen confronted his local family
planning officials to protest the forced abortion; they called the police to
report his conduct. 14 '
After the incident at the clinic, Chen paid
133. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 131, at 3.
134. Id. at 5. Although Zhang could not produce documentary evidence of paternity of an
aborted child, the immigration judge found that his testimony regarding his relationship with
his girlfriend was credible. Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 4. The BIA did not

make a finding of credibility.
135. Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 5-6. Note the BIA's apparent willingness
to recognize traditional, but illegal, marriage. Cf In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 919
(B.I.A. 1997) (extending derivative asylum to the legal spouse of a Chinese national forcibly
sterilized for violating the one-child policy).
136. Zhang, 395 F.3d at 532.
137. Id.
138. 152 F. App'x 528 (7th Cir. 2005).
139. Id. at 529.
140. Id.
141. Id. Zhi Zhi Chen testified that he tried to convince local authorities that he and his
girlfriend were adults-he was twenty and his girlfriend was twenty-one when they
conceived-entitled to have children. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 10-11, Chen, 152 F.
App'x 528 (No. 04-1551). He became so upset that he hurled profanities at the family
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snakeheads 142 to smuggle him to the United
States where he applied for
143
asylum based on his girlfriend's abortion.
The immigration judge denied his petition, finding that Chen's testimony
was not credible. 144 The judge characterized Chen's statements as "vague
and implausible" because he did not provide corroborating documentary
proof.14 5 Instead, the judge would have required medical records or
affidavits to confirm Chen's testimony regarding his girlfriend's
abortion. 146 Additionally, the immigration judge noted that Chen was not
entitled to an In re C-Y-Z- presumption of persecution because he and his
girlfriend were not married when she suffered the forced abortion.14 7 Chen
appealed this decision to the BIA. The BIA summarily affirmed the
immigration judge's decision, again refusing to extend presumption of
14 8
persecution to an unmarried partner under In re C-Y-Z-.
In considering and ultimately denying Chen's second appeal, the Seventh
Circuit reviewed the immigration judge's holding directly, as the BIA
summarily affirmed the immigration judge's decision without issuing an
opinion. 149 The court embarked on an extensive review of other circuits
that have addressed the issue of asylum rights for unmarried one-child
policy refugees, and agreed with the decisions in the Third and Fifth
Circuits granting Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation of the
IIRIRA in In re C-Y-Z-. 150 But despite this analysis, the court apparently
based its final judgment against Chen on the immigration judge's adverse
planning officials and overturned tables. Id. When they called the police, he ran away and
hid at a friend's house before escaping China. Id. at 12.
142. Snakeheads are human traffickers paid to help people like Chen leave China
illegally. See generally Cleo J. Kung, Comment, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human
Smuggling from China and the 1996 Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of
"Refugee, " 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1271 (2000).
143. Chen, 152 F. App'x at 529.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. See supra note 96 for an argument that determination of the credibility of Chen's
statements should have been made independently of his inability to provide documentary
evidence-i.e., the lack of corroborating evidence in and of itself was not a proper ground
for the immigration judge to make an adverse credibility finding.
147. Chen, 152 F. App'x at 529.
148. Id. at 528. In summary affirmations, one Board Member simply affirms the results
reached by the immigration judge without opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2005).
149. Chen, 152 F. App'x at 529-30. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the immigration
judge's decision for a "specific, cogent" rationale for its finding, supported by "reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." Id. at 530 (citing
Krouchevski v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2003)). This court would uphold an
immigration judge's adverse credibility finding if discrepancies in the applicant's testimony
go to the heart of his claim. Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2003);
Ceballos-Castillo v. INS, 904 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1990). The Real ID Act of 2005
lowered this standard, so that judges can base credibility determinations on minor
discrepancies that do not go to the heart of the asylum claim. See supranote 96.
150. Chen, 152 F. App'x at 530. But see Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993 (7th Cir.
2006), in which the same court recognized that an applicant who participated in a traditional
marriage that was not legally registered qualified as a spouse for the purposes of asylum
from China's one-child policy.
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credibility determination. 15 1 The Seventh Circuit held that even if the
immigration judge erred in making an adverse credibility finding based
solely on Chen's inability to provide corroborating evidence, "any such
error made no difference here."' 152 Thus, the court denied Chen's
application for asylum. 153 In cases involving both boyfriends and fianc~s,
the majority of circuit courts refuse to extend a presumption of persecution
to Chinese refugees who were not officially married to the actual victims of
the one-child policy in accordance with the BIA's decision in In re C-Y-Z-.
B. The Minority: No Deference to the BIA's Decision Restricting
Derivative Asylum Rights to UnmarriedCouples
Two circuits have taken a less deferential attitude towards marital status
restrictions on asylum rights when considering applications from unmarried
Chinese refugees based on their partners' forced sterilizations or abortions.
At least one court has recognized the intent to marry as sufficient to
establish the intimacy courts normally infer from a legal marriage. As such,
the court simply refers to the couple as husband and wife, even though this
terminology is technically inaccurate. This section considers cases from the
Ninth and Second Circuits declining to defer to the BIA's restrictive
interpretation in In re C-Y-Z-, which extends a presumption of persecution
only to legally married spouses.
1. The Ninth Circuit in Ma v. Ashcroft
The Ninth Circuit recognized the status of a Chinese refugee who
participated in a traditional, but not legal, marriage ceremony and granted
him asylum based on his "wife's" forced abortion. The applicant in Ma v.
Ashcroft154 married his "wife" in a traditional ceremony, but because of
their age at the time, the couple could not legally register their marriage
151. Chen, 152 F. App'x at 530 ("We need not decide this issue [whether to defer to the
BIA's interpretation of In re C-Y-Z- as applying only to married couples] definitively,
however, because Chen's petition failed for a more fundamental reason: an adverse
credibility determination.").
152. Id. at 530. The court offered no further explanation as to why the immigration
judge's error would not be harmful to Chen, when it seemingly affirmed his asylum denial
because of the adverse credibility finding below. Id. It is debatable whether the court strictly
applied the stated standard of review when it devoted only one sentence in the opinion, with
no supporting analysis, to the question of credibility-the issue on which both the
immigration judge and the Seventh Circuit rested their decisions. Id.; see supra note 149.
Perhaps the court's true motivation for rejecting Chen's petition was in fact its agreement
that courts should defer to the BIA's interpretation of the IIRIRA.
153. Although it decided Chen on other grounds, the Seventh Circuit has continued to
deny asylum to unmarried Chinese one-child policy applicants since reviewing this case.
See, e.g., Lu v. Gonzales, No. 05-2110, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25132 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2006)
(denying petitioner's asylum claim because the IIRIRA has not been interpreted as extending
to the boyfriends of Chinese nationals who were forced to undergo an abortion after
violating the one-child policy); Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that
boyfriends are not entitled to a presumption of persecution under the IIRIRA).
154. 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004).
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with the Chinese government. 155 Two months later, Kui Rong Ma's partner
became pregnant; afraid that the pregnancy would be forcibly terminated as
punishment for violating of the one-child policy, Ma's partner hid from
government officials. 156 Ma then attempted to register their traditional
marriage, but local officials denied Ma's application. 157 The registration
attempt alerted officials to the couple's underage relationship, and they thus
discovered Ma's partner's pregnancy. 158 When Ma refused to tell birth
control cadres where his partner was hiding, they beat him and arrested his
father.' 59 Ma's partner eventually heard of the arrest and came out of
hiding to plead for the father's release; instead, local officials seized her
and forcibly aborted her child in the third trimester. 160 62Ma then smuggled
1
himself' 6 1 to the United States and applied for asylum.
The immigration judge granted Ma's application for asylum on the basis
63
of his traditional marriage, even though the couple never legally married. 1
The judge characterized the couple as having what would be a common law
marriage' 64 in the United States, and concluded that there was no logical or
statutory reason to exclude common law spouses from the protection of the
IIRIRA. 165 Thus, the immigration judge expanded the BIA's ruling in In re
C-Y-Z- to grant a presumption of persecution to a traditionally, but not
legally, married man based on his "wife's" forced abortion.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service filed a notice of appeal in
Ma's case, asserting that only legally married spouses fulfill In re C-Y-Z-'s
marriage requirement for imputed persecution.166 The BIA agreed, refusing
155. Kui Rong Ma was nineteen and his partner was twenty-one at the time of their
traditional ceremony. Id. at 555. The couple would not have been able to marry legally for
three more years, when Ma turned twenty-two. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
156. Ma, 361 F.3d at 555. See supra note 28 for a discussion of the role of China's
Marriage Law in its overall population control policy and the implications of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies for Chinese couples.
157. Ma testified that he tried to register his marriage so he could live legally with his
partner. Ma, 361 F.3d at 555.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 556. Officials also levied a 5000 RMB fine on the couple for disobeying the
one-child policy. Id.

161. Id. Both Ma and his partner wanted to leave China, but Ma left first so he could
establish himself in the United States before bringing her to join him overseas. Id.
162. In support of his application for asylum, Ma submitted documentation showing that
his partner had had an abortion, a receipt for the 5000 RMB fine, and a picture of the couple.
Id. The immigration judge found his testimony and documentary evidence to be credible. Id.
163. Id.

164. Common law marriage occurs when a couple agrees to be and holds themselves out
as married without registering for a marriage license. See, e.g., Taegen v. Taegen, 61
N.Y.S.2d 869, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1946). In order to determine the existence of a common law
marriage, the court may consider evidence that the parties consented to be married,
cohabited, and represented themselves as married. Id. Only thirteen states and the District of
Columbia legally recognize common law marriages today. Judith T. Younger, Marital
Regimes:

A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and

Suggestionsfor Reform, 67 Comell L. Rev. 45, 75 n.235 (1981).
165. Ma, 361 F.3d at 556.
166. Id. at 557.
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to apply In re C-Y-Z- to unmarried partners of Chinese nationals who have
undergone forced abortion or sterilization. 16 7 The BIA contended that Ma's
inability to legally marry his partner was not connected to China's coercive
population control policy.16 8 In essence, the BIA reasoned that "although a
husband whose marriage is registered with the state may obtain refugee
status on the basis of his wife's sterilization or abortion, a husband whose
marriage is not so registered, because China's coercive population control
policy prohibits
registration, may not."' 16 9 The BIA revoked Ma's grant of
70
1
asylum.
Ma collected more evidence to submit to the BIA in an attempt to
persuade the Board to reopen and reconsider his case. During his detention,
Ma had turned twenty-two, the legal age to marry in China. 17 1 He
submitted an official document recognizing his "de facto" marriage along
with a document from the Chinese Communist Party detailing how the
72
Marriage Law intersected with the country's population control program. 1
Despite his efforts, the BIA again denied Ma's asylum claim, declining to
recognize Ma and his partner as legally married as required by In re
C-y-z-.173

Ma appealed the BIA's judgment to the Ninth Circuit. Although the
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all deferred to the BIA's decision
limiting the scope of In re C-Y-Z- to married couples in accordance with
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 174 the
Ninth Circuit took a different approach. Whereas those circuits found that
the BIA's interpretation of the IIRIRA passed Chevron's step two "arbitrary
or capricious" test, 175 the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It felt free to disregard
the BIA's opinion in In re C-Y-Z- because
[t]he BIA's refusal to grant asylum to an individual who cannot register
his marriage with the Chinese government on account of a law
promulgated as part of its coercive population control policy, a policy

167. Id. The BIA reached this decision in a 2-1 Board vote. The dissent would have
applied a different standard of proof to determine whether Ma was entitled to a presumption
of persecution, one based on the closeness of the couple's relationship, not documentary
proof. Id. The dissenting Board Member stated,
[T]here is absolutely no doubt about the relationship between the respondent and
his "common law spouse." Whether or not the persecuting country, China, would
decline to recognize the marriage on technical grounds, because the respondent
was under the age of [twenty-two], has little, if anything, to do with this asylum
application.
Id. at 557 (Schmidt, Board Member, dissenting) (alteration in original).
168. Id. at 557.
169. Id. at 558.
170. Id. at 557.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.

174. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the Third Circuit's
application of Chevron.

175. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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deemed by Congress to be oppressive and persecutory, contravenes
the
176
statute and leads to absurd and wholly unacceptable results.
The court clarified that Congress intended the IIRIRA to provide relief
for couples who were persecuted by the Chinese government in the name of
population control. 177 Since the goal of early marriage restrictions is to
shorten the period of time during which couples are both legally and
biologically able to reproduce, the Marriage Law is "inextricably linked" to
the one-child policy. 178 To deny asylum to an applicant who seeks relief
from the Catch-22 of China's coercive population control policy is "at odds
not only with the provision at issue here, but also with significant parts of
our overall immigration policy."' 179 Furthermore, the court noted that if the
couple had fled China together, Ma's "wife" would be entitled to asylum
herself because she personally suffered the forced abortion, but her husband
would be deported because he could not produce a legal marriage
certificate.18 0 Thus, the BIA's rule in In re C-Y-Z- would separate a family
on a technicality-an "absurd" result.' 8 ' The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor
of Ma, extending the scope of In re C-Y-Z- to include traditionally married
82
couples too young to legally register their marriage in China.1

176. Ma, 361 F.3d at 559. The court cites issues of consistency and rationality in support
of its decision not to defer to the BIA. Id. It notes that the courts do not give weight to the
BIA's judgment when it is unreasonable, contravenes Congress's intent in passing
immigration laws, or causes absurd results. Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,
334 (1992) (criticizing the district court's interpretation of the federal pre-sentence detention
credit statute because it would arbitrarily award credit to offenders based on the date they are
sentenced); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001)).
177. Ma, 361 F.3d at 560.
178. Id. In other words, a significant motivation behind the Chinese government's ban on
young marriages is an attempt to legally prevent those couples from having children. Id.
Young couples who cannot legally marry, and thus single women, who conceive a child,
regardless of the fact that they have no other children, violate the one-child policy. Id.
Violators are subject to forced abortion or sterilization. Id.; see supra note 28.
179. Ma, 361 F.3d at 561. To deny Ma asylum based on the supposed legitimacy of
China's Marriage Law would contradict Congress's express condemnation of the coercive
population control program because the law is an important part of China's overall policy
restricting childbirth. Id. The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Zhang v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2006). There, as in Ma, a couple participated in a
traditional ceremony, but could not register the marriage due to their age. Id. at 995. The
court held that a traditionally married applicant qualified as a spouse, noting that
Congress passed § 601(a)(1) of the IIRIRA to ensure that families who are victims
of forced abortion and sterilization under China's population control policy would
receive asylum, yet the IJ [immigration judge] denied the claim precisely because
that population control policy rendered the marriage illegal. That would entirely
subvert the Congressional amendment, and deny asylum to anyone whose
sterilization or abortion was set in motion by a decision to marry and procreate
prior to the minimum age.
Id. at 999.
180. Ma, 361 F.3d at 561.
181. Id. It is significant that the court characterized the Mas as a family, despite the fact
that he and his "wife" did not legally marry, because it recognized families as functional
units instead of legal entities-a modem approach this Note endorses. See infra Part III.C.
182. Ma, 361 F.3dat 561.
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2. The Second Circuit in Lin v. United States Department ofJustice
Acknowledging the differing approaches other circuits have taken to
determining the asylum rights of unmarried Chinese refugees claiming
asylum based on a partner's forced sterilization or abortion, the Second
Circuit chose to remand these cases to the BIA for clarification about the
role marital status should play in asylum determinations. 183 In so doing, the
Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, declined to defer to the BIA's
184
decision in In re C- Y-Z-. In Lin v. United States Department of Justice,
two boyfriends and a fianc6 challenged immigration judges' rejections of
their asylum applications based on their respective partners' forced
abortions in China. In his application, petitioner Shi Liang Lin claimed that
his girlfriend was forced to undergo an abortion because the two could not
185
legitimize their relationship by getting married, as they were too young.
Petitioner Xian Zou made a similar claim, but also argued that officials
186
threatened him when he vocally protested his girlfriend's abortion.
Petitioner Zhen Hua Dong based his asylum application on the facts that
local officials forced his fiancee to undergo two abortions and threatened to
sterilize and fine him if she became pregnant again. 187 Immigration judges
denied all three applications based on In re C-Y-Z-'s legal marriage
requirement for imputed persecution in one-child policy cases. 188 The BIA
summarily affirmed the immigration judges' ruling for each of the three
89
applicants.1
These applicants appealed their cases to the Second Circuit. As the BIA
affirmed their asylum denials without opinion, the Second Circuit reviewed
the immigration judges' decision directly. 190 Although Chevron would
require the Second Circuit to defer to the BIA's interpretation of the
IIRIRA, 19 1 here the court reviewed only the immigration judge's
interpretation. 192 The court found that immigration judges' statutory
interpretations cannot be considered rules carrying the force of law to
which Chevron would require it to defer. 193 Thus, in Lin, the Second
183. Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005).
184. Id.

185. Id. at 188.
186. Id. at 188 n.2. The immigration judge did not make a credibility determination as to
Xian Zou's testimony regarding his girlfriend's forced abortions. Id.
187. Id. at 189. The immigration judge found Zhen Hua Dong's testimony to be credible.
Id.
188. Id. at 188-89.
189. Id. at 189. See supra note 148 (explaining the summary affirmation process).
190. See supra note 149. Compare the Second Circuit's non-deferential approach to
reviewing immigration judge opinions with that of the Seventh Circuit in Chen v. Gonzales,
discussed supra Part II.A.3.
191. Lin, 416 F.3d at 189.
192. Id. at 190.
193. Id. at 191 ("[W]hen a court of appeals is faced with a BIA's summary affirmance,
the court has no way of knowing that the BIA has, in fact, adopted the IJ's particular
construction of a statute when the court is asked to assess its reasonableness.... [N]either
the BIA, nor the Ils, treat summary affirmances as binding in any event. There is, in sum,
no reason to believe that an IJ's summarily affirmed decision contains the sort of
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Circuit did not defer to the immigration judges' determinations that the
not win asylum based on their unmarried partners' forced
applicants could
94
abortions.'
Although the Second Circuit declined to defer to the immigration judges'
decisions, it was ill-equipped to embark on a de novo review because the
BIA had not adequately explained its rationale for extending the IIRIRA to
include imputed persecution for legally married couples and those couples
alone. 195 Instead, the court remanded this case to the BIA to: (1)
"articulate a reasoned basis for making spouses eligible for asylum under
IIRIRA § 601(a)" and (2) "clarify whether, when, and why boyfriends and
fiancrs may or may not similarly qualify as refugees under IIRIRA §
601(a)."' 196 While waiting for the BIA to issue clarification of In re C-Y-Z-,
to remand cases involving unmarried Chinese
the Second Circuit continued
97
applicants to the BIA.1
C. One More Try--Reconsidering In re C-Y-ZMore than a year after the Second Circuit remanded Lin, and nine years
since its original decision in In re C-Y-Z-, the BIA revisited the issue of
imputed persecution for married spouses and clarified the status of
unmarried Chinese refugees. This section presents the BIA opinion in In re
S-L-L-, 198 reaffirming its position that In re C-Y-Z- extends the reach of the
forced
IIRIRA to include married refugees whose partners have undergone
99
abortion or sterilization for violating China's one-child policy.'
The BIA upheld its previous decision extending derivative asylum rights
to married Chinese couples persecuted by coercive family planning
However, the BIA clarified that the presumption of
measures.20 0
persecution should be limited to spouses who actually opposed the other
authoritative and considered statutory construction that Chevron deference was designed to
honor. As a result, we decline to extend Chevron deference to any statutory construction of
the [IIRIRA] set forth in a summarily affirmed IJ opinion.").

The immigration judge's

interpretation of ambiguous provisions in immigration law is entitled to "no more deference
than the inherent persuasiveness of the IJ's view commands." Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d
540, 544 (2d Cir. 2005); see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We

consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act,
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.").
194. Cf Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2004) (deferring to the BIA's

interpretation of In re C-Y-Z- in a case where the asylum applicant claimed to be married).
195.
196.
197.
169 F.
198.

Lin, 416 F.3d at 191; see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Id. at 187.
See, e.g., Pan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2006); Deng v. Gonzales,
App'x 600 (2d Cir. 2006).
24 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2006).

199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.
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spouse's forcible sterilization or abortion. 20 1 The BIA offered two
arguments in support of its holding. First, according to the BIA, Congress
intended section 601 of the IIRIRA to redress not only physical persecution
wrought under the one-child policy, but also the Chinese government's
intrusion into marital relationships. 202 "When the government intervenes in
the private affairs of a married couple [i.e., decisions regarding children and
family] to force an abortion or sterilization, it persecutes the married couple
as an entity." 20 3 Furthermore, the BIA adopted the "sympathetic suffering"
argument first proposed by Judge Alito-that a husband experiences
suffering that rises to the level of persecution when his wife undergoes
forced sterilization or abortion. 204 As such, persecution of one half of the
205
marital unit can be imputed to the other.
But, the BIA would not impute persecution in cases involving unmarried
couples. It reasoned that
the sanctity of marriage and the long term commitment reflected by
marriage place the husband in a distinctly different position from that of
an unmarried father....
[A] husband shares significantly more
responsibility in determining ... whether to bear a child in the face of
societal pressure and government incentives than does a boyfriend or
2 06
fianc& for the resolution of a pregnancy of a girlfriend or fiancee.

The BIA also cited problems of proof in support of its exclusion of
unmarried couples under In re C-Y-Z-. For example, it would be difficult
for immigration judges to determine whether the unmarried applicant was
the father of an aborted child, whether local officials held the applicant
responsible for violating the one-child policy, and whether the applicant
and the actual victim had a legitimately close relationship. 20 7 The BIA
201. Id. For example, the unlikely husband who encouraged his wife to submit to a
forced abortion or sterilization would not qualify for asylum based on his wife's persecution.
See supra note 103 (analyzing Board Member Filppu's concurrence in In re C-Y-Z-).
However, a spouse need not prove that he or she personally protested the forced abortion or
sterilization; unless there is evidence to the contrary, the BIA infers opposition from the
marital relationship. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. at 8.
202. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. at 6. It is not clear how the BIA extrapolated this
statement of intent. The BIA even goes so far as to state that Congress intended the
IIRIRA's refugee definition to encapsulate legally married spouses. Id.
203. Id. The BIA recognized that the loss of a child and the infringement on the married
couple's reproductive rights caused by forced abortion constitutes persecution of both
husband and wife. See id. at 8.
204. Id. at 7; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
205. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. at 8 ("When parties have legally committed to marriage,
we recognize the requisite nexus and level of harm for past persecution when a spouse is
forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure.").
206. Id. at 9. In essence, the BIA characterizes children of married couples as planned,
but children of unmarried couples as unwanted surprises. Cf id. at 11 (noting that when
petitioner Shi Liang Lin's girlfriend told him that she "felt like being pregnant," the
underage couple applied for a marriage license so they could legally start a family and then
applied for and were denied permission to keep the illegal child when she later conceived).
207. Id. at 9-10. With a marriage certificate, the judge can simply infer paternity,
liability, and intimacy. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (summarizing Judge
Alito's argument that using marriage as a proxy for specific proof promotes administrative
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draws a clear line between married and unmarried couples seeking the
protection of U.S. immigration law.
However, the BIA does present unmarried couples with a different
avenue to pursue in asylum cases. An unmarried partner can try to show
that he or she personally resisted the one-child policy. 20 8 Resistance could
include a showing of anything from general opposition to the partner's
forced abortion or sterilization to specific attempts to prevent officials from
enforcing the policy. 209
Beyond proving resistance, the unmarried
applicant must also show that he or she has personally suffered harm rising
to the level of persecution due to the government's population control
program. 2 10 Upon such a showing, an unmarried Chinese refugee can
establish an independent claim for asylum. 2 11 After repeated requests, 2 12 in
In re S-L-L- the BIA issued specific guidance for the courts to follow in
considering asylum applications from unmarried Chinese refugees
premising their persecution on a partner's forced abortion or sterilization.
It remains to be seen how courts will interpret the BIA's reaffirmed
opinion that only married couples are entitled to a presumption of
persecution in Chinese one-child policy asylum applications. Certainly, the
majority of courts will not change their position; In re S-L-L- validates the
decisions in Chen v. Ashcrof, 2 13 Zhang v. Ashcroft, 2 14 and Chen v.
Gonzales.2 15 The Ninth Circuit is likely to treat In re S-L-L- as disdainfully
as it did In re C-Y-Z-, as the BIA again failed to take into account the role
played by marriage age requirements in one-child policy violations. 2 16 The
efficiency and convenience). The BIA dismissed an argument proposed by many unmarried
applicants: The couple would have legally married but for the marriage law, promulgated as
part of China's population control policy. See, e.g., Chen v. Ashcrofl, 381 F.3d 221, 229-30
(3d Cir. 2004). The BIA agreed that this is a sympathetic argument, but held that "rational
reasons" such as administrative convenience justify restricting In re C-Y-Z- to married
couples. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. at 12.
208. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. at 10.
209. Id.
210. To determine the individual harm suffered by one partner when the other undergoes
forced sterilization or abortion, immigration judges could consider factors such as whether
the unmarried couple
has [illegal] children together, has cohabited for a significant length of time, holds
themselves out to others as a committed couple, has taken steps to have their
relationship recognized in some fashion (perhaps having taken such steps
repeatedly, as where permission to marry has been denied by authorities based on
failure to meet the minimum age requirements), is financially interdependent, and
whether persuasive objective evidence of that relationship's continued existence
during the time that the applicant has been in the [United States] is presented.
Id. at 10-11 (alterations omitted).
211. In his case, petitioner Lin was not legally married and could not make out an
independent claim of persecution because "[m]erely impregnating one's girlfriend does not
constitute an act of resistance." Id. at 11. Therefore, the BIA again rejected his asylum
application.
212. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
213. 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
214. 395 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2004).
215. 152 F. App'x 528 (7th Cir. 2005).
216. In re S-L-L-, 24 1. & N. at 12.
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Second Circuit's view is unknown. 2 17 Absent a fundamental change in
immigration law, or in how courts view marriage and families, asylum
applications of unmarried Chinese asylum applicants are likely to fail.
III. ASYLUM RIGHTS FOR THE UNMARRIED PARTNERS OF CHINESE
NATIONALS WHO FLEE COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING MEASURES

This part argues that U.S. courts should abandon In re C-Y-Z-'s marital
status restriction on Chinese nationals fleeing the one-child policy. It
advocates individual findings of fact regarding persecution for all people
seeking refuge in the United States-married or unmarried. Part III.A
posits that abandoning marital status restrictions on one-child policy asylum
exemplifies Congress's intent in passing the IIRIRA. Part III.B questions
traditional policy arguments in support of marital status limitations. Part
III.C scrutinizes the underlying preference for traditional families that
motivates many asylum rejections. Part III.D assesses the asylum options
currently available to unmarried Chinese applicants and determines that
alternatives are inadequate; derivative asylum rights are crucial to ensure
their protection. Extending asylum to the unmarried partners of Chinese
nationals who come to the United States to avoid coercive family planning
measures upholds Congress's intent in passing the IIRIRA and
simultaneously avoids mistaken conceptions of families, floodgates, and
fraud.
A. Congress Intended the IIRIRA to Protect a Broad Class of Refugees
The IIRIRA expresses Congress's intent to make a strong statement
criticizing the Chinese government's human rights abuses. This section
maintains that ending the immigration system's reliance on marital status to
determine persecution would ensure that many deserving applicants win
asylum, thus fulfilling Congress's objectives for the IIRIRA.
Faced with public outrage over the Tiananmen Square massacre and the
one-child policy, two Presidents, their Attorneys General, and Congress
tried for seven years to pass legislation opening U.S. borders to victims of
Chinese governmental policies. 2 18 These lawmakers finally condemned
China's human rights abuses in 1996 by creating a specific grant of asylum
to victims of coercive population control. 2 19 Singling out Chinese refugees
fleeing the one-child policy as a group requiring special protection is a
testament to Congress's intent to create a broad grant of asylum to this class
of persons.

217. The Second Circuit granted a rehearing of Lin's case in November 2006. Lin v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, No. 02-4611, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28465 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2006).
218. See supra Part I.C.

219. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (outlining the IIRIRA's amended
definition of refugee),
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Despite international censure, the one-child policy continues to oppress
Chinese citizens. 220 Demand for asylum quickly outpaced the 1000 slots
the IIRIRA originally reserved for its victims. 22 1 Recognizing that the 1996
legislation did not adequately protect this class of Chinese nationals, in
2005 Congress strengthened the United States' commitment to asylum for
these refugees by removing the cap. 222 Even if the IIRIRA was originally
intended as a limited response to China's human rights abuses, the 2005
changes erased all doubt that Congress now intends to accept all deserving
2 23
asylum applicants.
The BIA's assertion that Congress intended the lIRIRA to cover married,
but not unmarried, couples 224 is completely unfounded. As the Ninth
Circuit averred,
Congress intended the law of asylum to protect
"couples." 225 Although the BIA has interpreted this statement to mean
"married couples and married couples only," a more reasonable
interpretation would be that Congress intended to protect "parents."
Congress's statement neither explicitly nor implicitly includes a marriage
requirement. Even if Congress believes that parents should be married, one
cannot reasonably conclude that U.S. lawmakers meant to punish those who
choose not to marry or, more likely, cannot legally marry in China.226
Congress intended quite simply to protect a class of persons who have lost a
child as punishment for violating China's family planning law-this class
naturally includes married and unmarried couples. 227 The BIA and federal
court decisions excluding refugees based on marital status contradict the
spirit and purpose of Congress's mandate.
B. The Circuit Courts' Policy Concerns Are Not CompellingJustifications
for Turning UnmarriedRefugees Away at the Border
Several courts, particularly the Third Circuit, worried that broadly
construing In re C-Y-Z- to apply to unmarried Chinese couples would cause
220. See supra note 37. The Chinese government has pledged to keep the one-child
policy in force for the foreseeable future. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
221. See Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum
Seekers 16-17 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32621.pdf (noting
that in 2003 over 7000 qualified people awaited coercive population control asylum status).
222. See supranotes 83-85 and accompanying text.
223. Notably, almost all of the cases discussed in Part II arose after the passage of the
Real ID Act.
224. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 6 (B.I.A. 2006) ("Congress was concerned...
with the obtrusive government interference into a married couple's decisions regarding
children and family.").
225. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(1), at 174 (1996) (quoted in Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553,
559 (9th Cir. 2004)).
226. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
227. Looking at intent in this way reveals a disconnect between Congress's approach to
the IIRIRA and its implementation by the courts. Congress considered the level of harm that
most parents would undoubtedly experience when a child is forcibly aborted and determined
that suffering, in general, constitutes persecution. Courts have focused instead on the status
of the parents as a proxy for harm.
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228
a mass influx of single men seeking to defraud the immigration system.
This section asserts that these concerns do not justify denying asylum to
otherwise deserving, but unmarried, Chinese applicants attempting to
escape coercive population control measures.
Apprehension about "opening the floodgates" to masses of Chinese
Considering the practical and financial
immigrants is misplaced.
difficulties these refugees, many of whom are quite young, face in reaching

the U.S. border, a flood of new immigration seems unlikely. 2 29 Statistics

from 2003 show that only 7000 refugees applied for asylum based on
coercive family planning measures; 230 this is hardly an overwhelming
number. 23 1 Even if extending asylum to unmarried one-child policy
applicants caused a ten fold increase in the number of Chinese refugees
admitted into the United States, the courts should not strain to avoid a result
sanctioned by Congress based on their own notions of marriage and family.
Given Congress's decisive action lifting the cap on one-child policy grants
of asylum, controlling the flow of new Chinese immigrants is not an
appropriate judicial concern. Courts improperly cite population fears as a
justification for restricting one-child policy immigration.
Courts' fears of accepting fraudulent claims are similarly overblown.
Any asylum applicant must make a credible showing to an immigration
judge that he, she, or a spouse suffered persecution in China. 232 A marriage
license is not the only possible way to prove a relationship with a victim of
coercive family planning measures. In fact, the law clearly recognizes the
difficulties refugees may have procuring official documents from
persecutory home countries; thus, an applicant can establish a credible
asylum claim based solely on his or her own testimony. 23 3 If the judge
requests corroborating or documentary evidence in support of the claim, an
applicant can still win asylum if he or she can provide cogent reasons
behind the lack of such evidence. 2 34 Indeed, "fleeing" a persecutory home
country implies that the refugee would not have packed supporting
documentation before arriving in the United States. A refugee could
credibly show the difficulty of extracting official documents from China's
carefully controlled bureaucracy; in contrast, refugees from war-torn or
228. See supra note 126.
229. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 3-4 (recounting how the then twentyone year old Zhang had to borrow 34,500 RMB from friends and family in order to acquire a
false passport from smugglers, which he used unsuccessfully in an attempt to enter the
United States).
230. See supra note 85.
231. For comparison, the Department of Homeland Security received over 46,200
applications for asylum in 2003. Office of Immigration Statistics, Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
Refugees and Asylees 46 (2003), available at
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/ 2003RA.pdf.
232. See supra note 96; see also Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B) (2000); In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 919 (B.I.A. 1997).

233. See supra note 96 (discussing procedure for immigration judges in making
credibility determinations).
234. See supra note 96.
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developing nations could equally show their inability to procure official
documents from a fragmented nation with little administrative
infrastructure. 2 35 Thus, the credibility determination in asylum hearings
checks fraudulent claims. 236 Even if an immigration judge insists on
documentary proof to support, for example, a Chinese national's claim that
he married his wife or that she underwent a forced abortion, documents
2 37
certifying these events may just as likely be fraudulent or mistranslated.
Problems of proof are inherent to immigration proceedings of all kinds;
fraud is not a persuasive rationale for denying asylum to a particular class
of Chinese asylum applicants.
Using marital status to combat fraud arbitrarily sets different credibility
standards for similarly situated Chinese applicants.
In some cases,
"husbands" have won asylum based on their "wives"' forced sterilization or
abortion even though their marriages were illegal in China. 238 Thus, as
long as an applicant asserts that he or she is married, the immigration judge
assumes that part of the claim passes muster. From one simple assertioni.e., "I am married"-an immigration judge infers credibility regarding the
closeness of the relationship between the partners, the opposition of one
spouse to the other's forced sterilization or abortion, a parental relationship
between the applicant and the aborted child, and the extreme harm wrought
on the applicant spouse.
Conversely, an applicant who truthfully and credibly claims a close
relationship with an unmarried partner does not receive the benefit of a
presumption of persecution. 239 In a sense, the immigration system is saying
that unmarried applicants are inherently not credible when claiming asylum
due to a partner's forced sterilization or abortion, regardless of the quality
of their testimony. Although immigration judges in all except one 240 of the
cases earlier discussed found the applicants' testimony about their
relationships with the mothers of their children and the subsequent forced
235. See, e.g., Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that an
asylum applicant from Algeria could not reasonably be expected to extract corroborating
evidence as simple as newspaper articles or court documents when he fled his home country,
which was governed by a military dictatorship at the time of his departure).
236. See Megan C. Dempsey, Note, A Misplaced Bright-LineRule: Coercive Population
Control in China and Asylum for Unmarried Partners, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 213, 239 (2006)
(arguing that standard operating procedures for handling asylum claims, particularly the
credibility finding, can detect and control fraud).
237. Document fraud is rampant in many immigration contexts, so much so that the
House of Representatives proposed and passed legislation that would characterize document
fraud by asylum seekers as an aggravated felony and would subject the applicant to
deportation. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 618 (2005).
238. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 n.8 (2004) (pointing out that the petitioners
in He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2003), Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 14445 (2d Cir. 2003), and In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) all won asylum
based on their "wives' forced abortions even though their marriages were underage,
unregistered, and thus illegal).
239. See supra Part II.B. 1-3.
240. Petitioner Chen's case in the Seventh Circuit was arguably erroneously decided. See
supra notes 146, 152 and accompanying text.
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Producing a piece of paper should not make one applicant's claim more
deserving than another's. 243 Courts' policy considerations should not
compel the denial of asylum claims to otherwise deserving Chinese
applicants.
C. RestrictingDerivative Asylum Rights to Married Couples Reflects an
Outdated View of the Family
Proponents of the marriage requirement might argue that judges are
concerned not with the marriage license itself, but with the closeness of
relationship the document signifies. Yet, the tone of many opinions
rejecting unmarried one-child policy asylum claims shows a clear bias
toward traditional marriages. This section suggests that the underlying
motivation for marital status asylum restrictions is in fact a preconceived
notion about what a family should be-a married mother and father with
their child. Instead of rewarding couples who follow the traditional, legal
route to marriage, the court should concern itself with the actual level of
harm suffered by an applicant, regardless of the status of his or her
relationship.
In In re S-L-L- particularly, the BIA's language evokes a derogatory
attitude towards unmarried couples who have illegally conceived. 2 44 In
restricting the presumption of persecution to couples who "actually
committed to a marital relationship," 24 5 the BIA indicated that it was
concerned not with the closeness of relationship, but with the closeness of
fit between the applicants and the mold of what "deserving" applicants
should be. Furthermore, statements regarding the different (read: lesser)
status of unmarried fathers reek of stereotype. 24 6 There simply is no
legitimate reason to deny individual asylum applications due to antiquated
generalizations about unwed fathers as irresponsible partners who assume

241. Only petitioner Zhang could not fully persuade the immigration judge of his
credibility. See supra note 134.
242. Petitioner Ma won asylum on the basis of his traditional marriage. See supra notes
162, 182 and accompanying text.

243. For an argument that all asylum applicants should be presumed credible based on a
narrative recitation of the persecution they have suffered, see Ilene Durst, Lost in
Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to the Refugee's Narrative, 53 Rutgers
L. Rev. 127 (2000).
244. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text (describing the BIA's unwavering
preference for married couples).
245. In re S-L-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 1, 12 (B.I.A. 2006) (emphasis added).
246. See generally Katherine K. Baker, Bargainingor Biology? The History and Future
of PaternityLaw and ParentalStatus, 14 Comell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (2004) (discussing the
modem recognition of parental rights of biological fathers, nonbiological fathers, married,
and unmarried men); see also David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition:
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 Am. J.
Comp. L. 125, 125 (2006) ("Unwed fathers.., are no longer categorically disregarded by

the law.").
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no responsibility for their partners or children. 247 A more modem
conception of family recognizes functional units, not legal units. 248 Parents
are equally persecuted partners because they commit to a familial
relationship, not because their relationship is sanctioned by the state.
Basing asylum decisions on personal biases and stereotypes is unjust.
Consider Mr. Zhang: Because he and his partner could not marry, he
could not produce either a marriage certificate or documentation proving
that he fathered his girlfriend's aborted child. 249 However, he helped her
avoid family planning cadres for some time, paid the fine levied on her for
their one-child policy violation, and even claimed persecution because he
could not live with the person he loved and wished to marry. 250 The
immigration judge found his testimony regarding these facts to be credible,
but still denied Zhang's asylum application because he was not entitled to a
presumption of paternity without a marriage license. 2 51 Yet Mr. Zhang is
not the picture of an irresponsible man fraudulently using his relationship
for asylum. Shedding preconceived notions about nonmarital relationships
would allow courts to reach the merits of individual asylum claims.
D. "OtherResistance" Asylum Is a Hollow Alternative to Derivative
Asylum Rights
It remains to be seen whether unmarried applicants will be able to
establish asylum based on their own resistance to the one-child policy under
the guidelines proposed in In re S-L-L-. This section speculates that an
unmarried Chinese applicant's chances of winning asylum after In re S-L-Lare no better than they were before. Instead, applicants who can establish
the requisite level of harm should be entitled to derivative asylum rights
regardless of marital status.
Pursuing In re S-L-L-'s "other resistance" option, which allows
unmarried applicants to win asylum based on their own resistance to a
partner's forced abortion or sterilization, is futile. Ironically, those
guidelines essentially require that the applicant prove he or she participated
in a common law marriage. 2 52 So, unmarried applicants cannot win asylum
based on their partner's forced sterilizations or abortions because they are
not married, but they can win asylum based on their own resistance to
247. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 141, at 13 ("A boyfriend who resists
coercive birth control measures on his girlfriend has the same and an equally strong interest
in the pregnancy of his girlfriend as a husband in his wife's.").
248. This definition of family underlies arguments in favor of same-sex marriage, assisted
reproduction, and same-sex or single parent adoption. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow,
Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status
Discriminationin Adoption andAssisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 305 (2006).
249. See supra note 134.
250. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant
supra note 131, at 6.
251. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
252. Compare supra note 164 (describing proof of common law marriage), with supra
note 2 10 (describing factors to be considered in "other resistance" to coercive population
control asylum cases).
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coercive population control if they prove that they are, for all intents and
purposes, married. This double standard is nonsensical.
Furthermore, the In re S-L-L- guidelines for proving individual resistance
ask immigration judges to do exactly what they have so adamantly resisted
in the past-to make individualized findings of fact regarding the closeness
of the relationship between unmarried partners who have suffered
persecution under China's coercive population control program. 253 Why is
the BIA willing to strictly scrutinize the petitions of unmarried Chinese
refugees claiming asylum based on their own resistance, but is absolutely
unwilling to do so in cases where the asylum claim is premised on a
partner's forced sterilization or abortion? Given the immigration system's
high priority on administrative convenience, 254 it is doubtful that judges
will be willing and able to engage in this intricate, and admittedly difficult,
task for people they consider to be lesser situated. There is no reason to set
different standards for married and unmarried Chinese applicants making
the same claim when both can credibly testify to persecution and to the
closeness of their relationship with their partners if given the chance.
Additionally, In re S-L-L- sets an unworkable standard for unmarried
Chinese nationals premising their asylum claim on the "other resistance to
coercive population control" prong of the IIRIRA. 255 The BIA requires the
applicant to show a nexus between his or her individual resistance to a
partner's forced sterilization or abortion and China's family planning
law. 256 However, the statute does not define the term resistance. The BIA
suggests that "expressions of general opposition, attempts to interfere with
enforcement of government policy in particular cases, and other overt forms
of resistance to the requirements of the family planning law" would
suffice. 257 But, if past decisions are any indication, Chinese applicants face
an insurmountable task in proving resistance. First, unmarried applicants
must credibly testify that they took some affirmative action of resistance
when the Chinese government ordered their partners to undergo forced
sterilization or abortions; 2 58 requesting permission for early marriage or

253. Congress contemplated the need for rigorous fact finding when creating new asylum
rights for one-child policy victims. Arguably, the immigration judges' failure to give claims
from unmarried Chinese nationals due consideration is not a result Congress would sanction.
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(1), at 174 (1996) ("Determining the credibility of the applicant

and whether the actual or threatened harm rises to the level of persecution is a difficult and
complex task, but no more so in the case of claims based on coercive family planning than in
cases based on other factual situations. Asylum officers and immigration judges are capable
of making such judgments.").

254. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
255. IIRIRA § 601(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(B) (2000).
256. See supra note 205.
257. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (B.I.A. 2006).
258. But note that a petitioner like Chen, who verbally berated family planning officials,
overturned tables, and openly protested his girlfriend's forced abortion, still could not
qualify for asylum based on his own resistance because the immigration judge characterized
his testimony as "vague" and thus not credible. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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childbirth is insufficient. 259 Additionally, unmarried applicants must
establish that they suffered harm equivalent to persecution due to a
partner's forced sterilization or abortion. 260 But it is unlikely that many
unmarried applicants, if any, could show that they have other children with
their partners or that they made multiple requests that the government
waive its marriage and birth regulations. The one-child policy was
designed to prevent unmarried couples from having any children; 2 6 1 if a
couple did somehow have children, waiver requests would only invite
government scrutiny of their many one-child policy violations. If they
requested permission to have an illegal child, the government would plainly
force them to abort it. 262 For most unmarried Chinese applicants, In re S-LL-'s "other resistance" option is no option at all.
Moreover, the In re S-L-L- "other resistance" asylum opportunity does
nothing for those applicants who, like Mr. Lin, wanted to make their
relationships official, but did not satisfy China's age requirements for legal
marriage. 2 63 In dismissing the argument that marital prohibitions, a vital
part of the one-child policy, prevented the applicant's compliance, the BIA
paints a picture of unmarried couples who remain so purely by choice, not
by law. 264 The courts should critically examine the lose-lose situation
young couples face in China, and factor this into the evaluation of
persecution. Until they do so, these unfortunate petitioners must return to
265
China in the name of administrative convenience.
Given Congress's dedication to reproductive freedom in China and its
censure of international human rights abuses, the risk that a refugee
suffered or will suffer persecution due to China's coercive family planning
measures should outweigh the risks of granting asylum based on a
fraudulent claim, opening U.S. borders to a flood of Chinese refugees, or
compromising traditional notions of family.
259. See In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. at 11. Considering the harsh punishments, including
fines and imprisonment, levied on people who defy the one-child policy, many violators
might reasonably choose not to resist in order to minimize these consequences. See supra
Part I.B.2. Furthermore, requesting population control waivers often alerts officials to
underage relationships and illegal pregnancies; thus, an attempt to comply with the one-child
policy results in persecution just as more overt defiance does. See supra notes 157-60 and
accompanying text (describing the consequences of petitioner Ma's registration attempt).
While unmarried partners must individually and affirmatively oppose government
authorities, a married man need only impregnate his wife to qualify for asylum. Cf supra
note 211 ("Merely impregnating one's girlfriend does not constitute an act of resistance.").
260. See supra note 210.
261. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
262. In fact, this is exactly what happened in petitioner Ma's case. See supra notes 15860 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 207. The BIA characterizes derivative asylum claims for married
spouses as legitimate because they "actually" committed to a legal marriage. In re S-L-L-, 24
I. & N. at 12. This implies that couples who made the effort to legalize their relationship are
more intimate or more deserving than couples who tried and failed or simply chose not to
marry.
265. See supra note 207.
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CONCLUSION

The one-child policy continues to devastate Chinese nationals and inhibit
their ability to exercise basic human rights. The United States has taken
considerable strides toward providing a safe haven for victims of China's
coercive population program. As a first step, the IIRIRA opened U.S.
borders to applicants who personally suffered forced abortion or
sterilization. The BIA doubled the number of Chinese nationals offered
refuge in the United States by interpreting the IIRIRA to provide derivative
asylum rights for the spouses of people who suffered forced abortion or
sterilization. Having come this far, justice demands one further step: The
United States should extend derivative asylum rights to Chinese nationals
fleeing the one-child policy, regardless of marital status. Unmarried
applicants deserve the right to present their cases for asylum based on a
partner's forced abortion or sterilization, even if this consideration requires
thorough fact-finding efforts by immigration judges. Instead of using
marital status as a proxy, courts should undertake individualized findings of
fact about the closeness of relationship and the actual harm suffered by
unmarried applicants when making asylum rulings. An unmarried Chinese
applicant who credibly demonstrates he or she has experienced harm rising
to the level of persecution when a partner underwent forced abortion or
sterilization is entitled to the protection of the IIRIRA.
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